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# ***JPRS Report***

## **West Europe**

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29 SEPTEMBER 1987

## WEST EUROPE

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## COALITION BESET BY INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Jul 87 p 8

[Article by Guenter Bannas: "Resumption of an Old Conflict: The Coalition's Dispute about Internal Security Merely Postponed"]

[Text] The dispute in the coalition regarding internal policy, data protection and the powers of the security agencies is still in abeyance. This is a dispute that has plagued the Union/FDP coalition from the very beginning. Disarmament and tax issues were the predominant issues in the 6 months after the government was formed. In the fall, though, the first drafts on internal security are to be discussed. Interior Minister Zimmermann heralded more to come next year. The coalition fractions' specialists on internal policy are therefore certain that the old dispute will soon flare up again. For that very reason Gerster, the Union fraction's new spokesman on internal affairs, has been trying with some success to encourage talks between Interior Minister Zimmermann and deputy Hirsch, one of the FDP's specialists on internal affairs (and the most troublesome among them). No such talks had taken place since 1982--except at sessions of the Bundestag and its committees--, the reflection of profound mutual mistrust.

The Union's specialists on internal affairs are somewhat worried looking ahead to the FDP Party Congress, slated for September next in Kiel, when a study group will devote an entire day to internal and legal affairs. They fear that the party congress will oppose all legislative plans cherished by the Union: The ban on disguises worn at demonstrations, criminalization of any advocacy of violence, a regulation criminalizing sit-ins (approved by Federal Justice Minister Engelhard, too) and the question of police powers. In Kiel, Hirsch will once again be the reporter of the discussions on internal affairs. He says that the FDP is not inclined at its party congress to adopt resolutions for the benefit of Zimmermann. Neither the Union nor the Ministry of the Interior dispute Hirsch's expertise. However, from the Union standpoint, it is precisely his preoccupation with detail that makes agreement difficult. Gerster is wooing Hirsch because he considers him the pivotal personage of the FDP in these matters. Other members of the Union fraction have their doubts. They think Gerster will come to realize that it is impossible to negotiate with Hirsch because he is inclined to raise new points of dispute the day after a compromise has at last been arrived at. They hope instead that the pragmatic line adopted by Justice Minister Engelhard and legal specialist

Kleinert will ultimately prevail in the FDP. Kleinert is the chairman of the FRDP fraction's study group on internal and legal affairs.

The section of the coalition agreement dealing with internal affairs has two chapters. To have been enacted in the last legislative session were the federal data protection law, laws on the protection of the constitution and military counterintelligence, amendments to the federal border protection law and the federal criminal court law as well as (and mainly) a cooperation law designed to regulate relations among the security agencies. All of the above are mentioned in the coalition agreement with the rather imprecise remark that "the following projects are under discussion at the present time." The other section relating to internal affairs is concerned with a ban on disguises worn by demonstrators (complete with the general threat of prosecution), the criminalization of the public advocacy of violence and a regulation regarding persons who turn state evidence. This is limited right off the bat by the annotation that, though there is a "need for action," "the following measures, in particular, are to be considered." Hirsch is unwilling to agree to any wider ranging regulation on the wearing of disguises by demonstrators. He feels "betrayed" because--in a progress report--Zimmermann welcomed the penal law on demonstrations as amended in 1985, but the Union is now calling for more changes. Other sensitive topics such as the policy on political asylum, were left open in the coalition agreement; they are not on the agenda. Nevertheless, the minister of the interior perseveres in his demands by claiming that the "pressure of asylum seekers" continues "undiminished."

The Ministry of the Interior is discreetly revising the legislative drafts from the latest Bundestag session that deal with data protection and the security agencies. First papers were conveyed to the fraction experts. Already preliminary remarks from the CDU and FDP indicate hard bargaining once the texts are submitted. Doubts are therefore justified whether the coalition will be able in the present legislative session to enact the plethora of legally complex (the police codes of the federal Laender need to be observed also) and politically disputed projects. Such doubts arouse political suspicions in Hirsch: Many Unionists secretly harbor the wish for nothing to be done at this time--at a later point the Federal Constitutional Court might well at least somewhat curtail its data protection demands of December 1983. The Union's internal affairs specialists appear willing to tive up the cooperation law (ZAG), hotly disputed before the Bundestag election. Gerster as well as Hirsch are advocating that the respective regulations on the exchange of information be spelled out in the laws applying for the respective agency. While this removes the unloved ZAG from the agenda, it does not facilitate resolution of the issue.

It appears that criticism of Zimmermann's style of operation is growing inside the Union. By dragging out discussions on the composition and terms of reference of an independent government committee (according to the coalition agreement) to once again deal with the analysis of violence and proposals for combatting it, Zimmermann is accused of having offered the FDP an opportunity to explain and harden its attitude at public hearings. Admittedly, according to the coalition agreement, the committee's deliberations are not supposed to delay the enactment of legislation. However, FDP politicians are already claiming that the work of the committee and legislative action need to be

considered as a whole and seem quite content with the fact that Zimmermann has not conducted any preparatory talks with them. Union criticism is directed more at Zimmermann's stubbornness in his dealings with the FDP than at differences of political opinions. Still, the latter were recently underlined by some Union deputies speaking up against the minister's policy toward aliens and asylum seekers. At times it seems as if mistrust between CDU and CSU politicians is greater than that between CSU and FDP deputies--at least these latter know where they are with regard to each other.

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## PAPER VIEWS FUTURE OF POST-BRANDT SPD

## Party Convention Report

36200260 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Jun 87 p 5

[Unattributed article: "The Reform Policy Path Has Not Been Fully Explored"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 Jun--The SPD's special party congress on 14 June in Bonn, with the departure of Brandt as party chairman, Vogel's election to the chairmanship, and Lafontaine's election to serve as new deputy chairman along with Rau, will convene under the watchword "Tradition and Perspective." By that, as its spokesman Verheugen said on Friday, the SPD wishes to emphasize its importance as Germany's oldest party which is orienting itself towards new answers for the future. The party congress should supply the confidence that the SPD, mustering the strength for solidarity and the will for renewal, will succeed in changing the majority relationships in the Federal Republic. The adoption of a "Bonn Declaration of the SPD" serves this purpose. It was sent on Friday to the executive committee members and the party congress delegates.

In the declaration, the following is given as the base line: "We shall continue to develop the resolutions passed in Nuernberg and translate them into political action. The reform policy path has not been fully explored." Today, the "essence" of reform policy does not exist solely in changes. Even the preservation of humane living conditions and an equilibrium with nature requires of politics a "readiness for renewal." Now as before, the SPD regards itself "as a populist party which knows that it is obligated to the tradition of the workers' movement." It struggles for majorities "so that, in the interest of the majority, it can accomplish its policy of democratic, social and ecological reforms and continue the work it began of ensuring peace through detente and disarmament." The Federal Government's policy consists solely of a comfortable "carry on"; a "fundamental opposition" consists solely of "the outrage at this." The SPD, on the other hand, wants to define its "reform policy." It wants to provide answers to the contradictions and challenges of industrial society's transformations. Mentioned as the "foremost tasks" of SPD policy: "Reduction of unemployment; continued development of the social state; a living together in solidarity of native-born and foreigner; women's equality and elimination of the patriarchal social order; control and



guidance of technical progress in the service of man and nature; ecological renewal of industrial society through preventive protection of the natural foundations of life; secure and economical energy supplies without atomic power; democratization of the economy through codetermination and the just distribution of wealth; defense of civil rights and further development of the social and democratic constitutional state; and acceptance of the principle of common security as the basis for a peaceful order in Europe."

The convening of the party congress had become necessary after Brandt attempted on 23 March to end a smoldering leadership crisis, of which the appointment of an independent Greek woman as party spokesperson was only a symptom, with the announcement of his resignation. Some 439 voting delegates, 198 with consultative voting rights, and about 650 guests and 610 journalists are expected at the party congress in Beethoven Hall in Bonn. It will be opened by Rau. Words of welcome will be spoken by Austrian Federal Chancellor Vranitzky, Bonn's Lord Mayor Daniels (CDU), and--at Brandt's request--Inge Jens on behalf of the "August Bebel Circle" of artists and scientists. Only 13 motions will be before the party congress. Some of them concern the election of Brandt to the post of honorary chairman, which was also proposed by the party presidium. The appeals commission is directed by Rau. Proposals containing political demands and those for statutory changes (for example, for the installation of four deputy chairmen and the determination that every leadership board must contain 40 percent women), will be referred to the next regular party Congress.

#### Outlook for New Leadership

36200260 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Jun 87 p 12

[Article by Helmut Herles: "Vogel and Rau--Brandt No More"]

[Text] Bonn, 11 Jun-- "It is abundantly clear that in a mass party such as ours, not all opinions can immediately be reduced to a common denominator. In a party such as ours, the broadest possible freedom of opinion must exist and never will such a difference of opinion do harm to the party if the criticism is objective and the precepts of comradeship are not disregarded. There has been a considerable lack of that recently, however." This is a maxim which Hans-Jochen Vogel, who, as Brandt's successor, will be elected on Sunday as the new party chairman of the SPD, could say today. That description of the SPD's condition, however, was formulated as long ago as 1929 at the Magdeburg Party Congress by one Hans Vogel, who, as "Reich secretary" at the time, sought to preserve Hermann Mueller's ability to govern, the last Social Democratic chancellor. It was not a success. The consequences are known.

Hans Vogel lived from 1881 to 1945, was a member of the Reichstag from 1920 to 1932, a full-time "secretary" from 1927 on and in exile from 1939 to 1945. Vogel--the contemporary (no relation to the other one)--knows that he is now assuming the most difficult assignment of his life.

The appeal to the history of the SPD is a part of the therapy which Vogel, while still faction chairman in the Bundestag and as deputy party chairman, had prescribed for the party following the fall of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, for which Brandt's SPD was essentially responsible. Now Vogel wants to gain perspectives for the party's renewal not least of all from history. Not only the cultivation of historical consciousness, but also of party work down to the level of the local association, the striving to become less bogged down in the internal debate, and above all to be mindful of the "internal effect" of the working groups and circles--this intention is evident in all of Vogel's speeches. He wants to begin immediately his work therapy for the party with visits from party district to party district.

After his election, Vogel--as did Schumacher and Ollenhauer--will unite the faction and party chairmanships in his person. He will thus be Wehner and Brandt rolled into one, so to speak. He would have preferred, however, to have been Helmut Schmidt's successor since he is by nature an "officiating chancellor."

Vogel wants to reorganize the SPD with the help of his administrators, Anke Fuchs as national secretary and Ulrich Klose as treasurer. Anke Fuchs contributes the life and business experience of a Social Democratic family--that of deceased Hamburg mayor Nevermann--and she contributes labor union training, ideas and energy. She has the proper basic orientation for Vogel: "I do not want to be powerful, but successful." Vogel himself had led the Seeheim Circle of the center-right majority, which has now become a minority. Can it be opportune for him that Anke Fuchs owned up to being a Seeheimer? As secretary she will presumably no longer be able to say it that way in view of the fact that the left wing has already protested and even the party executive committee has once again expressly endorsed the resolution "jumping off" the nuclear energy bandwagon which she has characterized as dishonest. The SPD's national secretaries are still waiting for the strengthening of their position by election at party congresses. But in the final analysis that is not the issue; rather the issue is how they work within the party, that is: whether they can devise, describe and organize campaigns at Peter Glotz' literary level.

Vogel also wishes to lead intellectually, not merely administer. He will do so less in the essayist's manner of Peter Glotz, but rather in the persistence which the sociologist Max Weber once recommended to politicians. Vogel has remained true to the themes of his election campaign as a candidate for chancellor--for example, the search for a "conclusion of peace" between man and nature. Catholic Vogel has just expressed himself on this topic in the HERDER-KORRESPONDENZ. The "principle of the social state" should be supplemented by a "principle of the natural state." Layer Vogel knows the problematic nature of such abstract constructs. But even as the justice minister who was an important advisor to Chancellor Schmidt for counter-terrorism, he had transcended the limits of his portfolio.



With the Catholic Vogel as chairman--a novelty in SPD history--and with the likewise Catholic-oriented deputy Lafontaine and the Protestant Johannes Rau, the PSD can more easily than before take up topics which also concern the churches. If Vogel does not lose the labor union members over this, who are less church-affiliated, he could experience a revival of the SPD. But it is precisely those Social Democrats who were "born into" the party who are today suffering from it. Their spokesmen in the Seeheim Circle, despite all their misgivings because of Vogel's "molting" and his coming to terms with the Greens and the peaceniks, are counting on him because his perseverance prevented a Chairman Lafontaine. Brandt was not able to fall back upon his grandchildren and his favorite grandchild. He has to leave his legacy to Vogel and Rau.

Vogel could take over the leadership of an SPD after the voters have at least temporarily put an end to Brandt's pink-green dreams in the Hesse Landtag election, and the SPD in Hamburg appears to have won back the freedom to form another coalition. The red-green "laager mentality" has collapsed. With this, the desire of Vogel and Rau that the SPD once again become more of a party and speak more from its own self, could be fulfilled. Vogel has learned from Rau. His maxim "Go get the people where they are" could also come from Rau. He is already deputy party chairman and, in contrast to Lafontaine, does not need to be elected on Sunday. Once again, many see in him the reserve strength of his party.

And Lafontaine? Has not his spell been long since broken? When the organizers of the peace movement were planning the big demonstration on the eve of the SPD Party Congress, no one lifted a hand for him. Lafontaine hurt himself with his coups and, despite the politeness, with his often insulting language. One recalls the reflecting on the secondary virtues with which one could also supposedly organize a concentration camp, which concerned and injured then Chancellor Schmidt, or his most recent reference to the Miners and Chemical Workers Unions as drill field democracies. There has been muttering about Lafontaine. Many feel that there could be a repudiation by the ballot on Sunday. Vogel is warning against it for the sake of reconstitution and discipline.

And Brandt? How will he adjust to the new configuration at the head of his party? Will he take his leave in the manner of a vindictive and self-exonerating speech along the lines of his resignation declaration before the party executive committee? Or will it be a statesmanlike speech such as in the case of his last appearance as party chairman in the Bundestag? Or one as well as the other? Heretofore Vogel has always been loyal towards Brandt. The new chairman is counting on the loyalty of the honorary chairman-to-be, and with reason: For Brandt is leaving the bridge, but he is remaining on board.

#### Brandt Steps Down

36200260 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Helmut Herles: "Just a Touch of Self-Exoneration and Vindictiveness"]

[Text] The extraordinary (in both senses of the word) SPD Party Congress for the occasion of the departure of Chairman Brandt, the election of Vogel as successor and, in addition to Rau, of the new Deputy Party Chairman Lafontaine; the stage spread with glowing red carpets, the delegates gazing at large red letters on a white background: "Tradition and Perspective." On the left wing of this "altar," a saying by Jean Jaures could be read; "Tradition does not mean honoring ashes, but rather keeping the flame burning." And on the right, the new chairman's political teacher, Waldemar von Knoeringen, was quoted: "Our policy demands perspective. We need orientation in accordance with the basic values of socialism and we need antennas into the future." As usual, the entire leadership sat on the stage, among them politicians whose fate is tied to that of Brandt--in success as in failure--Bahr and Boerner, for example. Helmut Schmidt has his seat down below, next to Ernst Breit, next to the Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky, near to Pierre Mauroy and the young wife of the party patriarch. There, too, Josef Felder, the last of the honorable Social Democratic Reichstag members who did not vote for Hitler's Enabling Act, could be seen.

Rau and Vranitzky tuned up the party congress. It was set at a pitch of gratitude. Rau's speech was both a quiet justification of his policy and of the past electoral campaign, which he would have come through better if, at that time, the party had really been led by Brandt according to Rau's liking. Vranitzky recalls Brandt's role on the world stage and submits to the Germans that his legacy is the very gesture which was controversial in Germany and for which many an Austrian now envies the Germans because the earlier conditions for repressing the past become painfully evident time and again in the neighboring country: "He had the strength to kneel down and with this gesture he did not humiliate his country, but on the country, liberated it."

But this party congress is--once again--Willy Brandt's party congress. He had requested 1 and 1/2 hours for his speech. Although in the end he considerably reduces the 27 closely-written pages in reading them, it stretches to nearly 2 hours. It is a speech full of barbs. Brandt has put on the dark blue garment of the statesman with the vest and watch chain of August Bebel. But he stands at the speaker's podium like one who would like to carry on. Or nervously working the left leg like a boxer. Finally, the sweat of exertion breaks out on his brow. But the oscillation between pensiveness and aggressiveness is the most important soft-voiced rhetorical device: When he listens after his aphorisms, whether they have also had an effect--the good ones, the critical ones, the self-critical ones, and the subtly angry words. There is also a touch of self-exoneration and vindictiveness in it, even though he assures that he is not looking back in anger.

Brandt also speaks as a former journalist, as an autobiographer and occasionally as the protector of his own monument. The first chapter of the speech is dedicated to freedom. And always it is also the confession of a lifetime. Nonetheless, during the rhetorical appeal to the audience, he does

not bow his head too low, his self-confidence is unmistakable, his contrition is not too contrite. During the assertion of Social Democracy's demand for freedom, he speaks not merely about the resistance to Hitler, he says what has not been heard for a long time: "We did not knuckle under to the brutal challenge from the East."

#### A Rhetorical Marathon

He does not mention Helmut Schmidt, but in the second chapter, "Responsibility," he nonetheless includes him anonymously in his pride in the period in power which began in 1966 with the Grand Coalition and ended in 1982, not least due to the fault of the SPD itself. In his self-portrait he remains self-confident even in self-criticism: "I have made my share of mistakes. I have not always taken into consideration everything which should have been considered. For that I am sorry." And after a short pause, laconically: "And that is about it." Applause. The text is studded with aphorisms: "I have no use for a Teutonic pseudo-authority which is demonstrated by pounding the table. The pounding impresses the table little--and whom else?"

Brandt takes his leave not only as the leader of the party, but, for the sake of the preservation of peace and the "motivating force" of German politics--as he entitles two further chapters of his rhetorical marathon--he also appeals for a thawing of the hardened laager mentality and for a relaxation of the two major parties' rigidity. Brandt leaves not only as an internationalist, as a man who wanted to bring about peace between North and South as well as East and West, but also as a patriot. The concluding chapter is superscribed with the principle of hope and, however much intended to be a legacy, is once again a piece of self-characterization and self-stylization. This time with Camus: "We may even imagine Sisyphus to be a happy man. In any case, he had strength." And once again his leave-taking in the context of the upspoken French phrase which could serve as the secret motto of the party congress: "For me this day means...a deep cleft." And then again the passing shot: "I do not wish to pass judgement on it, about what it will mean in the history of the party. At least not today and not here." His own judgement about his era: "For 23 years I have tried to manage properly." Brandt, multicolored in his policies and in his personality, displays many rhetorical colors. At the end it almost becomes a monologue and he speaks about himself in the familiar, almost as if he were standing next to himself: "Certainly you remember the successes of past years, but also very clearly the defeats as well, especially those which you think could have been avoided. The more than insight into human frailties, and not only those of others, becomes almost commonplace--the more the opportunity fades for giving full vent to the naive optimism of your youth..."

The party congress applauds for almost 5 minutes and many women bring him roses. For a brief moment Helmut Schmidt stands before Willy Brandt. Brandt reaches for his arm, Schmidt very quickly withdraws. Soon the SPD will have its honorary chairman. Nonetheless, in the end this Sunday turns into Vogel's party congress. Opel workers have presented him with a watch made from an

engine component. And so, too, he begins his first address as the new chairman--with work therapy and a work program. And in the secret balloting he has been shown, by 404 yes votes to just 9 no votes, greater confidence than Oskar Lafontaine, who, in Brandt's view, should have become the successor. Lafontaine got the reprimand by way of the ballot--62 said no.

#### Vogel Takes Charge

36200260 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Jun 87 p 14

[Article by Helmut Herles: "Not a Bad Start"]

[Text] Bonn, 15 Jun--It was not a bad start for the new SPD Chairman Vogel and thus for his party. To be sure, feelings ran high once again for the old idol. But Brandt's era is over. Brandt is no longer the chairman but the honorary chairman, and thus he is now really that which he has often been in the practice of his party leadership in recent years--more the figurehead of the party's ship than the captain. Vogel had a difficult time of it in his first party congress speech as Brandt's successor. After Brandt's gripping political/feature story farewell performance it fell to him to bring the party back to earth. And at present, the earth is a stony place for the SPD. But at the same time, Vogel--just as Brandt--wished to have the principle of hope blaze forth as the Social Democratic principle plain and simple. Vogel began with the "cruelties" of the beginning. To be sure, it did not become a speech of repentance, but Brandt's repeated attempts to deny that the most recent elections have diminished the SPD's standing, not to mention the blotting out of the Schmidt era, were put right by Vogel without directly attacking his predecessor on that score. Vogel was consistent with that which he had already said as a candidate for chancellor shortly after the loss of power in Bonn: He is neither a Brandt nor a Schmidt-man, but he is himself. Not in the style of Brandt, then, as the preserver of his own monument, but as a jurist and as a party instructor, as the "punctator maximus" and the "headmaster." Perhaps now from the headmaster will come the educator of the party. Vogel clearly differentiated his leadership style from that of the "not-only-but-also" of his predecessor. He returned to the SPD its character as a party. He does not view it as a movement including the "independent Social Democrats" or as a "forum" of all the new movements--although even Vogel does not want to turn them away. He characterized his style of leadership this way: I want to achieve what I am capable of achieving. I will not demand more of anyone than I myself am prepared to do. I wish to be out in front of the party, and I want to bring together whatever can be brought together. Everyone should have his chance to speak. But then decisions must be made. And these decisions must then be binding and obligatory for everyone." Some people burst out in shocked laughter at this point. Vogel's enthusiasm for work is almost more threatening than promising for many in the party.



Vogel paid Schmidt the respect which that Social Democratic chancellor (as Brandt described Schmidt) deserved. Vogel, in contrast to Brandt, did not cite Chancellor Schmidt anonymously and abstractly as a part of the "governmental responsibility," but mentioned him by name. After his speech he went down into the first row of guests to shake hands with him. The delegates thanked both of them with applause. This peripheral event unobtrusively set straight Brandt's version of history.

The energy with which the less eloquent speaker held the party together during the time--so poor for dramatic staging--at the conclusion of this Sunday party congress, was a good starting omen for Vogel. More important still, however, were the results of his election and the clear lead over Lafontaine. Only 9 delegates voted against Vogel, and 63 against Lafontaine, whereby the latter did more poorly than Treasurer Klose, whom he had sponsored. Since Klose happened to be celebrating his 50th birthday, the SPD gave a summer party in the Ollenhauer House. Lafontaine said to a journalist: "You wrote that the magic spell was gone from me. But that is the best success I have ever achieved at a party congress." He supposedly was saying that to prevent "historical myths." Lafontaine wanted to make the first speech after Brandt. He did so, but it just did not help. Previously, he succeeded in getting the party executive committee to decree that the party resolution to reject nuclear energy in the future be recalled more clearly in the declaration "Tradition and Perspective" than had been done in the draft. Thus, now as before, he remains strong despite this rebuke. At the conclusion, Brandt demonstratively took Lafontaine's old seat in the second row on the executive committee's dais--which, however, was merely a gesture. Brandt would have rather seen the Saarland Minister President in his seat on the front bench. Once again on that "party evening" the honorary chairman gave the appearance of the introspective Indian. "Leave-taking is always a little bit of death." But he remains, not only as a figure of history, but as president of the Socialist International and as an author of books. His remaining is filled with thorns and barbs for his successor. For in his farewell speech he "simply" differentiated the "occasion" of his resignation--the appointment of an independent Greek woman to the post of party spokesperson--from the "reason": "When something no longer endures that has endured for a long time--when a great to-do is made out of a personnel matter and an influential minority of elected persons departs--then, with my length of service, it is time to turn the page. The book is not yet done, however; a new chapter begins--still, or perhaps now really for the first time, under the general title of "Free and Left'." Brandt is very free to sketch the causes of his stepping down in such an abbreviated manner, and very leftist to lash out primarily towards the right in the SPD, despite the fact that the rebellion had come from the left wing.

Klose already proved himself on this evening to be one of Vogel's "administrators." He treated that passage by Brandt with irony. Really, Brandt's book is called "Left and Free." Has Brandt consequently already written a new book or can one look forward to a new one? And Klose dealt with Lafontaine's "party coup," that coup with which he got him the post of treasurer without even taking off his coat, in the style of the cabaret: With his election Lafontaine now gets an office in Ollenhauer House and then he will no longer have to appear in a coat.

Party evenings are important for the SPD as a "living association." Wounds are attended to here; there is recognition of who is a friend of whom and who is an enemy of whom. One finds out, for example, that the provisional editor-in-chief of VORWAERTS, Gode Japs, first learned from the press release that from 1 October on his new boss would be Guenther Verheugen. By that time at the latest, Vogel will have to have found a new press spokesman--to date, the new boss' only conspicuous weakness at the start. Rau looked very serious, not only on this evening, but also on the stage at the party congress. A short while ago he had still been the candidate for chancellor, simultaneously celebrated and left in the lurch. At least there appears to be a "union of chancellor candidates" consisting of two members, Rau and Vogel, in the SPD. It remains to be seen what will be the result of Vogel's gesture. At the conclusion of the party congress he stood between Lafontaine and Rau and drew both to himself, which for the reserved Vogel is almost an outburst of exuberance. But in his heart Vogel is different than his reputation anyway and he also has a sense of humor. When Brandt was quoting the Indian literature--"They took off the newly elected one's pants and held him a moment over the fire. You should not remain on your chief's seat"--Vogel nodded ironically with his head at this moment, whereupon Brandt added: "I am speaking about myself." But Vogel knows that this Indian comparison also applies to him.

Vogel values the SPD's tradition and wants to build up its self-confidence through its pride in its history. For this reason, too, party congresses are staged today in a similar manner as at the time of the similarly-named exile chairman in World War II, Hans Vogel. When the latter was party secretary, a "Red Falcon" came on the stage and presented Wels, the leader at the time, with a bouquet of red carnations: "The workers of Magdeburg thank you with this bouquet of flowers for the fine achievement of the party congress." Then the party congress and, "accompanied by the powerful sounds of the organ, the Socialists' March": "On Socialists, close ranks!" That is the way Heinrich August Winkler described it in his work on the labor movement during the Weimar Republic (Dietz Verlag). With Brandt, there were roses. Each of these party congresses is intended to convey a bit of Social Democratic "celebratory culture," and in the process, today as in the past, they do not even shrink from religious appearances--formerly in Wels' hymnic words: "And the light shines out in the darkness?" And today, Bjoern Engholm speaking of the SPD as the "great mother" to whom ought to be given the words of the philosopher Karl Jaspers for reflection: "We are mortal when we are hard-hearted, immortal when we love." And once again the party congress sang. Some, like Vogel and Rau, knew the text well; others like Lafontaine, only appeared to move their lips: "When we go marching side by side and the old songs resound..." But the party congress was singing that way even when Wehner, Brandt and Schmidt were standing next to each other but were not leading the party "side by side." It will now be seen as to what will be myth and what will be reality about the new "troika," and whether the new National Secretary Anke Fuchs and Treasurer Klose will succeed in reorganizing the party so that Vogel can lead it.

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## HAMBURG COALITION TO EXTEND LOCAL SUFFRAGE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by F.U.E: "SPD and FDP Intend to Introduce Local Suffrage for Aliens in Hamburg"]

[Text] Hamburg intends to be the first federal Land to introduce local suffrage for aliens. In their coalition negotiations, the SPD and FDP have "in principle" agreed to extend local suffrage with respect to the seven district assemblies to aliens resident in Hamburg. However, according to the spokesmen of the two parties, no concrete decisions have yet been taken; detailed regulations are presumably to be worked out in the next round of the interrupted coalition negotiations, set for 3 August. FDP chairman von Muench believes in a "probable" agreement by the potential coalition partners, because the election programs of both the SPD and FDP had called for suffrage for aliens.

It is not certain at this point how long an alien will have to reside in Hamburg before being allowed to vote in district elections. According to von Muench, the period of residence required will most likely be "somewhere between 5 years and 7 years. Also undecided is the question whether only citizens of EC and European Council member countries or all aliens are to be granted local suffrage. If voting rights were to be extended to aliens from EC member countries only, the roughly 53,000 Turks (the largest group of aliens in Hamburg) would be excluded. They would be included in both the other cases. The "Alliance of Turkish Immigrants" speaks on behalf of a total of 20 Turkish groups, ranging from religious Muslims to left wing social democrats. Some 175,000 aliens live in Hamburg; if all were to get the suffrage, the numbers of voters (now around 1.25 million) would increase by about 6 percent.

The local suffrage extension envisioned by the SPD and FDP has already been sharply attacked. The CDU opposition in the assembly gave notice of objection and did not even exclude the possibility of an appeal to the Constitutional Court. The CDU has not changed its view according to which a uniform EC rule would have to come first. Preempting such a rule would be "highly inappropriate." The CDU is entirely opposed to the extension of local suffrage to aliens from countries outside the EC. The party fears that local elections might be radicalized if foreign groups were to inject their national conflicts.



The Hamburg GAL [League of Guest Workers], on the other hand, described the reform plans as "long overdue." Aliens from countries outside the EC should not be excluded, because such an exclusion would inevitably result in the division of aliens into "first and second class aliens." The Workers' Welfare Organization and the Protestant Charitable Trust also welcomed the SPD and FDP initiatives. They hope that local suffrage for aliens will make these latter more prepared to shoulder some responsibilities and result in better integration. The German Labor Union Federation called on the heads of government in all federal Laender to emulate the Hamburg initiative.

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## LAFONTAINE FACING MORE OPPOSITION IN SAARLAND

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Jul 87 p 4

[Article by M.T.Z.: "Opposition Accuses Lafontaine of Agitation: 'Playing the Great Man Game'/FDP Land Chairman Calls for Resignation"]

[Text] The two opposition parties in Saarland's Provincial Assembly are harshly critical of Premier Lafontaine (SPD) who has ruled in Saarbruecken for the past 2 years. In view of Lafontaine's "unrestrained and lying agitation" against the Federal Government, CDU Land chairman Jacoby described the premier as a "liability for the Saar," and FDP Land chairman Rehberger called upon the premier to resign, because Lafontaine (who is also deputy SPD federal chairman) is about to "sacrifice" the Land "on the altar of his party career." Rehberger repeated his proposal for the "revival of the Homeland Federation idea" which dates back to the time before the Land joined the Federal Republic of Germany and suggested the establishment of an all-party government. Since, due to his confrontation policy, Lafontaine is not capable of sober cooperation with all political forces, he must make place for a "more moderate Social Democrat." Jacoby did not join in the demand for Lafontaine's resignation. He continues to hope for a change of government following the elections to be held in spring 1990.

The present situation is characterized by the lowest employment figures since 1957, by the stagnation of restructuring in the steel industry and by imminent lay-offs in the mining industry, while no success worth mentioning is being recorded with regard to the arrival of new industries in the Saarland. Jacoby therefore considers Lafontaine "a would-be political great who has turned nervous faced with the collapse of his policies." Lafontaine is wrong in asserting that the Federal Government is letting the coal, iron and steel regions stew in their own juice. Jacoby claimed in Saarbruecken that Bonn has paid DM520 million in direct subsidies to Saarlouis in 1983-1986. In recent years, the Federal Government also granted operating aid in the amount of DM712 to Saarberg. For Lafontaine to nevertheless talk about Bonn's "pauperization strategy" implies nothing more than "political maneuvering."

Lafontaine is also accused of concealing the fact that the Federal Government will pay a capital accrual in the amount of 3-digit millions to Saarberg and is granting special allocations to the Land. These latter are regarded with some suspicion by other federal Laender--including those having SPD

governments. Bonn, for example, is providing 3 times DM100 million financial aid for structural improvements in the Saarland. The coal and steel location program provides DM45 million for the Saar. The merger between Dillinger Huette and Saarlust, proclaimed with much fanfare, has been postponed indefinitely. This project requires the approval of the French Government which is an indirect proprietor of Dillinger Huette. It needs to be politically secured in Paris, but Lafontaine is no longer received in France--not even for talks of a purely technical nature.

Rehberger reminded the Land government that it had received a total of DM4,871 billion in federal moneys in 1980-1986. Indeed, with respect to per capita direct and indirect aid, the Saarland has been ahead of the other federal Laender for many years. Nevertheless, the much heralded "exemplary rehabilitation" of the ruined Land finances is nowhere visible as yet. For the fall Rehberger forecasts another "dangerous liquidity bottleneck" for Saarlust, 76 percent of the capital of which the Land has acquired. The 8,500 minimum manpower figure promised by Lafontaine cannot possibly be maintained, just as the merger with Dillingen cannot be completed. The FDP chairman foresees the scissors opening with regard to the development of jobs. In the past 2 years more than 600,000 new jobs were created in the Federal Republic. If the development in the Saarland had been proportional, this would have yielded 10,000-15,000 new jobs. Instead the total of jobs has declined further. Nobody need be surprised that corporations are disinclined to settle in the Saarland given the fact that the premier likes to travel across the Federal Republic and represent the Saarland as living "in the shadow of the ....., " that--for purely ideological reasons--more and more harrassing speed limits are ordered on Saarland motorways, and Lafontaine causes employers' federations and free professions to be booted off broadcasting bodies for allegedly being "socially irrelevant groups."

Thursday last the Saarbruecken Land chancellery upheld its accusation of the Federal Government as pursuing the "pauperization" of the iron and coal industry by its failure to adopt an appropriate policy for the steel industry and by continuing with the replacement of coal. In 1983-1985 alone, the Land treasury had contributed more than DM1 billion of the DM1,574 million subsidy to Saarlust.

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## RAU'S INDUSTRIAL POLICIES CRITICIZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Jul 87 p 12

[Article by Lothar Beyer: "Rau Plagued by a Weak Constitution: The SPD in Duesseldorf Helpless in Confronting the Difficulties of the Coal and Steel Industry"]

[Text] The state of affairs now prevailing in the Rau Cabinet in Duesseldorf and among the political leadership of the SPD in North Rhine-Westphalia cannot yet be described as a crisis. It would be more to the point to call it constitutional weakness--possibly no more than temporary, who is to know? The head of government discusses with his ministers how best to counter the political-publicity activism of the new CDU Land chairman. They complain about the SPD's and the Rau government's lack of assertiveness on the local radio and television channels and do not hesitate occasionally to directly intervene at the West German Broadcasting Service in Cologne. One of the cabinet minutes mentions that the protests of steel workers on the Ruhr should be "more emphatically redirected to Bonn." But while the SPD in Duesseldorf favors the assertion that the Federal Government is alone responsible for all the ills of the Ruhr region, ministers are quarreling among themselves whether in future to behave more aggressively or whether--like Rau--to "continue with a statesmanlike attitude." Suddenly Rau frankly admits to reporters that the North Rhine-Westphalian SPD has for some time past "been less assertive" in the political debate "than I like it to be."

The SPD has no party spokesman in the Land: Land manager Bodo Hombach, formerly indispensable to the SPD and Rau in Duesseldorf, is looking for a new career with the Westdeutsche Landesbank. The normally very fluent premier is now liable to frequently "misspeak" himself. On one occasion, for example, he said that, after his chancellor candidacy, he had needed "to refamiliarize himself with Land politics." SPD members are speculating about a major cabinet reshuffle. Rau, on the other hand, does not wish to embark on any major personnel decisions, at least not before the coming Land party congress in Bochum where he will be up for reelection. Nevertheless there is much talk about various party personalities: Finance Minister Posser wishes to retire at the end of this year. SPD provincial assembly fraction leader Farthmann, once labor and social affairs minister, would like to return to the cabinet but as head of a new and rather custom made department designed to take on overall responsibility for the economy, transportation, rural and urban

planning. This would mean the end of the road for current Urban Planning Minister Zoepel who would have to return to the back benches. Before any of this can happen, though, it will be necessary to make sure of the top job at the Central Land Bank in Duesseldorf for present Economics Minister Jochimsen. At the moment that job is still held by president Wertz, a former finance minister. Once Jochimsen makes the move, it will remain to be seen whether Rau will assign his Interior Minister Schnoor to the Ministry of Finance, and whether he will appoint his chancellery head Leister to the interior ministry. Speculation is rife at SPD headquarters in Duesseldorf.

Rau's schedule indicates that he would like to wait until after "his" fall Land party congress to reshuffle the cabinet--already looking forward to the 1990 provincial assembly election. In the meantime he is worried by other issues. The uncertain future of hard coal mining on the Ruhr and the latest wave of closures in the steel industry have demonstrated very clearly that the structural change in the region has not progressed satisfactorily even after almost 20 years of SPD rule in the Land. The closure of foundries and rolling mills in Hattingen and Oberhausen showed that replacement jobs are lacking everywhere. Rau is compelled to frankly admit that he is basically lost for an answer to the coal and steel problems. If he had, he would not call on the Federal Government to adopt a 4-year program involving DM2 billion investment subsidies for new jobs in the coal and steel districts--with Duesseldorf taking on a third of the cost. Rau obviously did not expect the lukewarm response by Chancellery Minister Schaeuble, according to whom regional structural policy is primarily up to the Laender and municipalities. Schaeuble's letter served to remind Rau of his own responsibilities.

By asserting that Bonn and Brussels are mainly competent for steel policy, Rau wished to liberate himself from the political liability for the consequences. He strictly refuses Land contributions to the indispensable social plans for dealing with the series of closures at Thyssen Stahl. For the longest time Duesseldorf refused to take seriously Bluem's statement that anybody wishing to cooperate in Bonn's "steel round" would have to make a contribution. Now Rau is complaining that he was not invited to the Bonn summit talks. Actually he is reasserting his demand for direct talks with Kohl. In the meantime the Rau Cabinet has changed course. They are now ready to provide Land subsidies for social plans. Bluem took note of this change by saying that all parties could have saved themselves months of grief if Rau had seen the light sooner. Bluem has now suggested a kind of "Land steel conference," a round of talks among party and fraction leaders in North Rhine-Westphalia. The Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs wants quick assistance operations in order to overcome the acute emergencies in Hattingen and Oberhausen. He is primarily concerned with relieving the steel workers of the fear of mass layoffs and thereby avoiding uncontrollable reactions. He knows that the real decisions in the next Brussels negotiations on excess capacities and production quotas for steel are likely to be delayed, possibly even beyond September.

In the Ruhr district Bluem acts like the Federal Government's "authorized agent" in matters steel policy. Of course he uses the opportunity to present himself as the new CDU Land chairman in North Rhine-Westphalia. The Federal Labor Minister thus makes his appearance on the local scene. Rau will now



have to decide whether, for the sake of the common good, he should meet with Bluem who will challenge him at the Duesseldorf provincial assembly election. So far he still sounds somewhat hesitant. Rau and the SPD in Duesseldorf do not yet appear to have come to grips with the fact that the new man at the head of the North Rhine-Westphalian CDU tends to resolutely grapple with problems, to talk to employers, employees and enterprise councils instead of holding seminars on economic theories. Rau is still calling for a "national steel conception" and, consequently, the Federal Chancellor. Bluem, on the other hand, is examining the possibilities for concrete action in Hattingen and Oberhausen. And calls on Rau to join in to the best of his ability.

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## KOIVISTO LEADING 'MORE SELF-CONFIDENT FINLAND' TOWARD EUROPE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jul 87 p 10

[Commentary by Nils Morten Udgaard: "Finland's 'Europeanization'"]

[Text] It is often the case in politics that small, and in and of themselves insignificant, changes gradually begin to create an interesting pattern: the Finns are in the process of becoming associated with a pattern which says that they are becoming "Europeanized"--more like the rest of Europe in its domestic politics, and closer connected to the countries to the south and west through trade and foreign policy.

Earlier this month President Francois Mitterrand visited his Finnish colleague, Mauno Koivisto, who also sees the central role which France plays in European cooperation, both today and in the future. It was a successful meeting, despite the fact that the two have clearly different views on such central issues as the role of nuclear weapons. While Koivisto saw a sign of "important progress" in the area of disarmament, Mitterrand found it necessary to emphasize that "for several years yet, peace in the world will depend upon the deterrent of nuclear physics." But his well-known skepticism concerning particular disarmament proposals from the Soviet Union and the United States created no doubt among the Finns of the propriety of the visit.

The relaxation of political tension which we are experiencing in Europe has made it easier for President Koivisto to lead Finland as well in the direction of cooperation within Western Europe. And he has taken advantage of the opportunities. As of the first of January last year, Finland became a fully-qualified member of the free trade organization EFTA, following 25 years as an associate member, and during the fall last year, the Finns joined the European space organization ESA--but here, again only as an associate participant. In contrast, the Finns have involved themselves in the Western European research cooperation under Eureka. They pursue Finnish national interests--access to markets and connections with international high technology--and do it with a new and strengthened consciousness, without many side glances to the neighbor in the east.



The Russians, for their part, have accommodated the Finns, due to the decline in oil prices, and therewith the value of Soviet exports to Finland as well-- of which oil constituted nearly 80 percent. The imbalance which developed in what previously had been a "bartering arrangement" is being equalized in two ways: first, the Russians' portion of exports from Finland is being reduced-- from about 20 percent last year, to an estimated 15-16 percent this year. And second, the Russians have agreed to establish an interest-bearing account from which withdrawals can be made partially in hard currencies, in order to bridge the imbalance which they acknowledge is not just temporary.

The final outcome may be that the Soviet Union's influence in the Finnish economy will be reduced, even though there also are signs which suggest that the Russians will take advantage of many years of good experience in new projects--"joint ventures". The thoughts which one of Mikhail Gorbachev's closest economic advisors has proposed concerning Soviet free ports in the Baltic Area for trade and production, demonstrate the perspective which may develop for the Russian's traditional partners in this part of the world.

Finland also has fallen into line with the rest of Europe in its domestic politics as well, among other things, in that the country now has a conservative prime minister--previously unthinkable in post-war Finnish politics. The party-politics currents in Europe also are reaching Finland, which has become a more receptive and--above all--a more prosperous society. The highest international creditworthiness, which Norway just has lost, is something which the Finns guaranteed themselves long ago--and they enjoy a living standard which is higher than both the British and the French.

This Finnish prosperity--which has grown at a tempo and steadiness which has been exceeded only by the Japanese--is based on broad and bipartisan decision making when its plans are made. Among other things, this has contributed to the public sector being significantly less important in the Finnish economy than, for example, in Sweden and Norway, and has improved the Finns' ability to make a "capitalistic" market adjustment when required. EC countries today are the completely dominant partner in the Finns' foreign trade, and account for more than 40 percent of commerce--or double the percentage for EFTA countries.

This explains part of the orientation toward Europe, while political considerations at home explain other changes: following the Center Party and agricultural interests being excluded from the Finnish government for the first time in more than a generation, foreign minister Kalevi Sorsa acknowledges that he no longer will talk about the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line in the country's foreign policies--named after two Center Party leaders. From now on, this will be called "Finland's Line."

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## GOVERNMENT URGED TO TAKE MEASURES ENSURING SVALBARD VIABILITY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jul 87 p 10

[Letter to the Editor by Berner Larsen, Bodo: "What Now, Svalbard?"]

[Text] For all those interested in Svalbard, there is as a rule bad news in the picture when coal mining is involved. The closing of Svea was a shock for all of those who thought Svea would remain as a core area for Norwegian activity on Svalbard. Mine 7 was a technological shock for a former mineworker (1956-64). This was coal production at its best. But what does that matter, said our guide, when the mine is very profitable up to the point where shipping to Nasset begins. Then our profit begins to be eaten up by extra expenditures. It is expensive to operate and maintain a civilized society.

The town of Longyearbyen is as good as new, with living conditions which are comparable to any other advanced place in Norway. A new cafeteria can feed many people. A new power station should be able to provide energy for many activities.

## Many Alternatives

Tax conditions can provide for many undreamed-of possibilities. Never before has there been talk of alternatives on Svalbard. For all firms, the telephone, telex and data transmission systems are the central life nerve in the creation of new jobs.

A Spitsbergen International Business Bank also could be established in the shelter of tax rules--a bank which could compete with Swiss banks regarding secret accounts. The bank could focus on international finance. The legal authority for such a bank on Svalbard ought to be granted. Significant beneficial side effects would benefit Svalbard in connection with just ordinary success. If the polar island could be used for fishing, it would bring with it interesting new jobs. If a processing plant with women workers also were created, it would be a very fortunate arrangement for the people in Longyearbyen.

There could be a need in Norway and on the continent for storage in the permafrost. There might be a need for clean safe storage of art and other items of value.

## Polar Sciences

A training and research center for the polar sciences ought to be established soon--a cooperative project between the Norwegian Polar Institute, Tromsø University and possible foreign institutions such as the Polar University in Alaska. An art academy with international participants also ought to see the light of day as soon as possible, with subject areas including drawing, painting, writing, photography, video technology, and not the least, textile art. The academy should focus its efforts on bringing Svalbard into the art world.

## Radio and TV

Svalbard, including Longyearbyen, deserves its own local radio, either under the auspices of NRK [Norwegian Broadcasting Company] or some other organization. A television service also ought to have the right to live. Local reporting and editing create interest in nearby areas and events. The recordings would become cultural history as programs gradually fill the archives.

A local production company for video and television programs also could be established. This is where tax conditions (10%) enter the picture. But artistic criteria count a lot. Who has seen life in the mines in a dramatized form? We know very little about the people who work up there. Products could be produced which would interest people way beyond the boundaries of Norway. These are just a few ideas in a nutshell. If a larger study group concerning Svalbard's future were put together, I would recommend the following groups be represented:

Longyearbyen Association of Laborers, Longyear City Association of Foremen, Greater Norwegian Spitsbergen Coal Company A/S, Kings Bay Coal Company A/S, Engineers Organization of Svalbard, Norwegian Polar Institute, Norwegian Svalbard Company, Norwegian Polar Club, Svalbard Association, Arctic Association, and Norwegian Polar Navigation A/S.

A quick-working brain trust from the above-named concerns, organizations and institutions certainly would have projects on the building blocks in short order, but the government, through the affected departments, would need to pay for the project.

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## VPK'S JORN SVENSSON ON REASONS FOR PARTY'S TROUBLES

36500162 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 May 87 p 3

[Interview by Hakan Bergstrom: "Can You Infuse VPK With New Life?"]

[Text] [Introduction] On Saturday the Left-Wing Communist Party (VPK) opens its 28th party congress. The Swedish Communist Party will also become 70 years old. There might be a fight over the party-leader post, since the party leadership and the party leader, Lars Werner, have been criticized internally for a low profile and a diffuse ideology. On the eve of the congress, a couple of districts have committed themselves to Jorn Svensson, a member of parliament, as the new party leader. Jorn Svensson stands out as the visionary and the analyst of the party, one of the few who has also tried to sketch, in detail, a model of how a socialist Sweden would function. He is an academician and a planning director on leave from the County Government Board in Kristianstad county, a Communist member of parliament since 1971.

He will not as yet comment on the party-leader question, not even to say whether he is interested in becoming the party's leader now that the VPK is going down in the opinion polls. He has all the more to say about VPK's sometimes conservative attitude towards current issues and its lack of vision. He is also a member of the parliamentary commission that is investigating the assassination of Olof Palme. He feels that the Palme assassination and the investigation have demonstrated how fragile the Swedish democracy really is. Moreover, he feels that Lars Werner should not do commercials about buttermilk.

Active Social Democrat

[Question] Your maternal grandfather, Jons Svensson, was a social-democratic pioneer, union man, and strike leader in Skane. What would he think about today's social democracy?

[Answer] I believe that he would have remained a Social Democrat. He was the firm and loyal type. His elder brother, who inspired him, was among the ones who founded the first socialist association in Kristianstad in 1886. The two brothers lived for several decades in a state where there was no Communist party.

He would probably have felt that a Communist party was something new and unusual. He probably would have remained loyal to social democracy, but he would have been darned mad at Feldt. That is my guess.

[Question] While you were an academician in Lund, were you an active Social Democrat?

[Answer] Oh, yes!

[Question] What made you leave the Social Democratic Party?

[Answer] It was what happened to the official policy of the Social Democrats in the 1950's and 1960's. I remember very well when some economists, with upper middle-class manners, came to Lund from the Government Offices. They spoke in terms of apparently objective economics, but I found that they advocated nonsocialist ways of thinking.

That brought about a critical attitude, which later led to a breach. But note well: I have never urged any Social Democrat to leave his party. That is everyone's own business. And radicals are needed within the social democracy.

[Question] You have sometimes painted a dark picture of the parliament, described it as an assembly in the hands of government and bureaucracy. You wrote in a book in 1974 that "The parliament in Sweden has never managed to concentrate on passing an independent decision, initiated from below." After 16 years as a member of parliament, have you had reason to revise that notion?

[Answer] No, in our constitutional system, the parliament is bound by the initiatives of the government. That is why, in the long run, it is important that there are active opinions in the society which, at an early stage, react to significant issues and decisions. However, it requires a completely different insight, than the current one, into what happens in the official apparatus.

Handicapped By Age

[Question] Do you believe in a parliamentary road to socialism?

[Answer] If we imagine a transition to a basically different social system, a completely different activity is required in society. Then the parliamentary decisions will not be the main thing. The parliamentary decisions will become a confirmation of the public opinion.

However, the decision about a transition to a socialist system must be based on free choice, where the majority has spoken for such a change.

[Question] Is that why the VPK, in its party program, says that the party will fight each restriction of parliamentary government?



[Answer] Of course. The parliamentary system will become more developed under socialism. The powers of the parliament will be extended. Of course, it is important to defend the current parliamentary form of government, but this form of government is also deformed by the fact that the economic power is not controlled by the parliament and that the power of the government is so strong; the government keeps a staff of specialists which are difficult for the parliament to challenge.

[Question] You wish for a more active public opinion. In your view, is there a political indifference among the youth activist groups, for instance?

[Answer] No, I don't think so, but I believe that we are slipping into a new era. We have acute problems with housing, living conditions and depopulation of the sparsely built-up areas. Parallel with these problems, we have the more vital, existential threats of our time. These large issues are especially important to the young generation.

That is why I think that we are nearing a period of completely different public activity, outside of party politics, and that is highly desirable. Our party system is somewhat calcified...

[Question] Then the VPK is also a calcified party?

[Answer] We have probably not avoided our part of the calcification process. We are not going to deny that we are somewhat handicapped by our age.

[Question] How has the calcification manifested itself in VPK's policy?

[Answer] We are suffering the effects of the right-wing wave, expressing themselves in an increasing shortsightedness in our policy, a certain irregularity and light opportunism. I simply feel that sometimes we are too conservative.

[Question] On what issues?

[Answer] We are too prone to say no and to being a party of discontent. We are not sufficiently willing to propose constructive and forward-looking alternatives. We have been conservative in the health-care policy. It isn't only a question of always giving more money to the county councils and the local authorities. We should also acquire a philosophy about how the fight against diseases should be conducted. Nor have we been a particularly driving force when it comes to the care of the mentally handicapped.

The milk subsidies are another of my hobby-horses. We have been conservative there. From a health standpoint, people should not drink so darn much milk. So why should we subsidize the milk. It would be better to subsidize vegetables and fruit.

Lars Werner appears on posters and advertises buttermilk, he should rather have a Swedish apple in his hand than buttermilk. Put that down.

## Must Demonstrate Ideological Identity

[Question] Are you worried that you might have to leave the parliament?

[Answer] No, but at this time our position is too poor to be really healthy. We have to concentrate. We have to show an ideological identity.

[Question] As a Marxist, do you still feel that there is a constitutional progress towards socialism? You have written: "We could never choose to retain capitalism forever. Everything is constant change."

[Answer] Of course capitalism will be replaced with something else. The interesting question is: What comes then? The activity of the masses will decide whether socialism replaces capitalism. If you have weak activity among the masses, you might get technocratic and elitist fascism following capitalism. That is entirely possible and it should not be ignored.

[Question] Do you feel that capitalism has turned out to be more vital than what you believed in the 60's?

[Answer] What you could say is that the world-capitalistic system has a high organizational ability. There is cooperation between the large capitalistic nations, between the banking systems. There is an effort to guard against disruptions of capitalism by means of foreign exchange agreements and other measures. It is probable that this has extended the life of capitalism.

At the same time, capitalism has become more destructive. The leading capitalistic nations are driven to stronger measures against, for instance, the Third World. The exploitation has increased.

[Question] A couple of years ago, you wrote: "It is an incontrovertible fact that today's socialist societies do not appear as viable alternatives for the broad masses in the other, larger part of the world." Consequently, we lack good examples of socialism. Why should the voters believe that the Swedish Communists are going to be more successful?

[Answer] That is an inappropriate way of putting the question. I usually say that the purpose of our activity is not to bring the VPK to power. The purpose is to give power to those who lack power today. We cannot accomplish this alone, a radicalization on a broad front is needed--within popular movements and even within the social democracy.

## No Quarrel With Hot-Dog Vendors

[Question] But in that respect also there is a lack of good examples, models!

[Answer] Yes, but not entirely. The Italians have certain practical examples. The Italian Communist Party, together with the Socialist Party, has the parliamentary power in certain communities and regions. They have demonstrated a new philosophy in both trade policies and city-planning policy. One example of such a new philosophy is the closing-down of the large mental hospitals in Italy. If we ignore the fact that they have a one-party system which we do not



accept--the Yugoslavians have also given us interesting examples of local self-government.

[Question] You are one of the few, who have tried to sketch an outline of what a socialist Swedish society would look like...

[Answer] It is strange that I should be one of the few. I really feel that our party should be more actively interested in such visions.

[Question] In the book "You Will Take The Lead And The Power," you say that the members of the middle class have much to gain from socialism.

[Answer] Yes. For instance, there is no reason to harass the small farmers. We feel that our agriculture and our food production can be supported by a system of family farms. It is not a question of nationalizing farmland, possibly one or another large estate might be divided, so that tenant farmers can take over.

[Question] And small business owners have nothing to fear?

[Answer] No, it is a question of clearing away structures and power concentrations which prevent a democratic and socialistic social evolution.

We have no quarrel with hot-dog vendors and bicycle repairmen. They don't obstruct democracy.

#### Two Great Threats

[Question] What do you see as the greatest threats against democracy in Sweden?

[Answer] There are two great threats. First the large multi-national companies, those with a foreign base as well as a Swedish one. Their fundamental and longterm interests are, to a high degree, contrary to national independence. When these companies feel threatened, they constitute a power which could sweep away a national democracy.

The other threat can be found within our own government apparatus. It deals with obscure things, but I feel that the assassination of Palme, and things related to it, has taught us how fragile our democratic institutions really are. It demonstrates how easily power concentrations can arise and how they force things in a direction which does not agree with the principles of democracy.

Nor should we reject the thought that the murder conspiracy may have been based in our own structure. It was not the work of any fierce amateurs or lunatics.

[Question] You have already speculated on this. During a parliamentary debate, you did a theoretical analysis of possible perpetrators--and pointed to the American counter-intelligence. However, the first objection to such analyses of a murder must be that reality is seldom found in a theoretical pattern.

[Answer] Quite right, but in a situation where people were following a main trail which later proved to be false, I wanted to create a slight shock effect by pointing out that it could have happened in a different way. I wanted to get people to think along other lines.

[Question] It was provocation on your part?

[Answer] Yes, a slight but serious provocation. My contribution was not completely without effect when it came to defending the principles of a community governed by law. The honor goes mainly to Prosecutor Claes Zeime and other persons with civil courage who took a stand against Holmer's schemes.

[Question] The result was that the community governed by law could take it?

[Answer] Yes, fortunately. On the other hand it also showed how much of it was pure chance. For a long time it was a question of whether Holmer would be forced to retire or whether he could keep his post. The attitude of the minister of justice was, to say the least, unclear, since he avoided for so long trying to investigate the conflict between the prosecutor and the police.

Imagine if Zeime had not been the person he is. We could have had a staged process against a lot of people. We, the Communists, have seen such things throughout history.

[Question] So you have no great confidence in the Swedish judicial system?

[Answer] Our police--at least the criminal police--and the legal authorities have a high international standard. The total picture of the happenings after the Palme assassination is still that it came as an unpleasant surprise that things could go that far. It also came as an unpleasant surprise that the mass media were so indulgent towards Mr Sheriff; it took a long time before the mass media realized their role as critics.

[Question] You are the academician who became a Communist. Does this also, to some degree, reflect the evolution of the party; VPK has become a party for academicians rather than a party for the working class?

[Answer] No, that is not correct. 75 percent of the representatives at our latest congresses have been members from LO (the Confederation of Trade Unions) and TCO (the Central Organization of Salaried Employees). It is nothing new and remarkable that radical organizations attract intellectuals. It has been that way from time immemorial.

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## GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION PARTIES CRITICIZED FOR DISARRAY

## SDP Having Difficulty Governing

36500162 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Can Anyone Govern Sweden?"]

[Text] Swedish politics are faltering. There is no confidence in any of the blocs in their own ability to govern.

On the whole, the Social Democrats have been competent in the government and they have made some less pleasant decisions and reappraisals in order to maintain the responsibility for the economy. The party leadership realizes, however, especially after a trying spring in the parliament, that it will be difficult to rule the country as a minority on the day when the oil prices start going up and tougher measures are needed again. The hope for achieving their own majority no longer exists.

The nonsocialists are busy wiping out their hard-earned lessons from their years in the government. The Center Party is fighting to avoid today's opinion figures becoming the election result for 1988. Having cut its ties with KDS (the Christian Democratic Coalition Party) the party is almost four percentage units behind its position in the last election. The new leadership of the Moderates is fighting for its own survival and for domination of the nonsocialists.

Neither the expenditure demands from the Center nor the promises of lower taxes from the Moderates can pass the difficult test of governing. It does not seem to bother the two parties. The programs are there to regain voters, not to restore the Swedish economy.

The two parties without government aspirations, which have been holding meetings this past week, are making the situation worse.

Democrats have no reason to complain if the Communist Party loses voter support, maybe even to the point where it will no longer be a part of the government. It is more likely, however, that the VPK (Left-Wing Communist Party) will manage to hang on. But which VPK? There is more uncertainty about

that after the congress than before, a confusion which to all appearances will last through the election in 1988.

The Social Democrats feel the most sympathy for the followers of Lars Werner, but if the economic growth were to necessitate strong measures in order to slow down cost increases and lessen budget and trade deficits, wouldn't a VPK, ruled by pure opportunism, be as impossible to lean on as a party characterized by orthodox Marxism? It will probably be most difficult to cooperate with a VPK engaged in an inner tug-of-war between these two primary directions.

The Environmental (Green) Party affects politics even outside of the parliament. The fact that threats to the environment require action is brought to general notice, which is needed. At the same time, however, the competition from the Environmental Party makes it more difficult for the Center to compromise with the other nonsocialist parties. The Greens now attract environment-conscious voters in the large cities, which the Center otherwise could have reached in order to regain its position and become better able to cooperate.

If the Environmental Party cannot manage the four percent barrier in the parliamentary election, it can still rob the center parties of votes needed for creating a majority nonsocialist government, or for giving the center the leadership in such a government.

Nobody knows what will happen if the Environmental Party actually reaches the parliament. It will certainly not remain passive in the election of the prime minister. Its policy is to promote the candidate who is the least offensive in regards to the party's program. And that does not mean any kind of promise of support for the rest of the mandate period. Consequently, no one forming a government will be able to count on the Greens as part of the support for the economic policy, for instance. When it comes to overbids, the Environmental Party is almost worse than the VPK.

What will happen now? After all, Sweden must have a government and this government has to have the means of passing a cohesive policy.

The situation contains new and unusual elements and no one today claims to have a solution. One advice to responsible politicians is to show confidence in the voters and engage them in the question. Today's statistics are not election results. The voters should be informed about the consequences of their votes, in substance and in regards to the possibilities of governing Sweden.

The opposition still has the responsibility to make itself fit to govern as an alternative. If it cannot manage this, it cannot credibly turn the demand for responsibility towards others.

At the same time, no democratic party, nor the Moderates, can preclude in advance that the election result in 1988--in combination with the problems of reality--will be such that a government solution which includes all parties must be seriously examined.



The parliament ought to change its irresponsible ways of making budget decisions immediately. A joint responsibility for both expenditures and income must be placed on the finance committee. It should not be possible, at one and the same time, to create a majority for popular expenditures and to prevent a majority for unrewarding financing. When the authority of the government is unsure, the demand for the parliament to be more than a political playhouse is sharpened.

#### Nonsocialists Continued Disunity Analyzed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 87 p 6

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Opposition Divided By Jealousy"]

[Text] The political cannibalism is entering a new peak season. The success in the opinion polls of Bengt Westerberg, leader of the Liberal Party, gives no peace to the colleagues Carl Bildt (Moderates) and Olof Johansson (Center). It is again becoming more important to try to eat another nonsocialist party's sympathisers in order to strengthen one's own position than it is to challenge jointly the power hegemony of social democracy.

Bengt Westerberg's opinion-figures are stable and far above the election result. He enjoys far more confidence among the voters as a whole than do Olof Johansson and Carl Bildt.

The post-election analyses show that the effect of the party leader is great on the part of the nonsocialists. The party which has a popular and believable leader can, in the final days before the election, make great gains to the detriment of the other nonsocialist parties. Thorbjorn Falldin in the 1970's and Gosta Bohman are examples of the volatility of the nonsocialist voters.

Bengt Westerberg's success in the 1985 election, and since, has created both bitterness and jealousy among his competitors. Carl Bildt and Olof Johansson are in desperate need of revenge on behalf of their parties.

This automatically intensifies the fight over the nonsocialist voters, since the excellence of a party leader is only measured in election results. Most often, these voters cast their votes for the party leader who has managed to establish himself as being the main opponent to social democracy.

Bengt Westerberg's position as the number one nonsocialist candidate for prime minister has underscored an important change in politics. Ulf Adelsohn, Gosta Bohman and Thorbjorn Falldin were at war with the leader of the Social Democrats. The insults hailed and the election temperature rose.

Bengt Westerberg is pushing hard for a change in the government, but he is watching his step. He is on speaking terms with Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and with the Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt. Despite the sharp opposition on important political issues, there is a mutual respect among this trio for the way to carry out politics. Their personal chemistry is functioning, to use a modern phrase, despite the fact that Bengt Westerberg is



probably a greater threat to the power hegemony of social democracy than today's respective Right-Wing and Center leaders.

History plays a role in Bengt Westerberg's attitude. It would be a detriment to political progress, according to Bengt Westerberg, if the same attitude were to come between him and Ingvar Carlsson as once did between Tage Erlander and Bertil Ohlin.

Bengt Westerberg's good relationship with the social democratic leaders has impaired the relationship with Carl Bildt. Bildt and Westerberg were good friends and they saw each other privately, but Bildt's so-called Boden-speech on the defense became a turning-point.

In the Boden-speech, Bildt accused Westerberg of playing footsies with Ingvar Carlsson and of preparing a defense pact between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party.

In his attack, Bildt used privileged information that he had obtained at home in Westerberg's kitchen. Westerberg had put great effort into trying to create a joint nonsocialist policy on the defense issue, but Bildt wanted his own policy, at all costs, considering the atmosphere in the Moderate Coalition Party, and after that it only remained to settle with Ingvar Carlsson.

After fights about taxes and other things the relationship between Westerberg and Bildt has gradually deteriorated and now the leadership of the Liberal Party feels that it is difficult to know what Bildt is actually driving at.

While the Liberal Party maintains that the most important thing is to get one's own suggestions through the parliament, the Moderates deplore agreements across the party lines. It harms the confidence in the nonsocialist three-party alternative, and gives the Social Democrats the opportunity to talk of nonsocialist splits, according to the Moderates, who have given Westerberg the nickname, Mr. Clean.

Bengt Westerberg and Olof Johansson worked together in the Government Offices during the nonsocialist government era in 1976-82, where Johansson was a member of the cabinet and Westerberg a civil servant. The cooperation did not leave any open wounds.

Today the competition between an ascending party and a descending one has created a harsher situation, even though Olof Johansson has surprised everyone by being unexpectedly open-minded and not very dogmatic.

Bengt Westerberg called the Center Party a "high-class party for the farmers" in the 1985 election campaign, and that was not well received.

Consequently, it is a fact that the relationship between Carl Bildt and Olof Johansson runs more smoothly than the relationship between the center parties. In center-circles Bildt is viewed as an open and intellectual debater who does not seem patronizing, even if the ideological gulf is sometimes deep.

In 1976, it was an accepted fact that Thorbjorn Falldin was the nonsocialist prime minister candidate and that the policy was going to rest on the basis of the so-called center-alternative. The Moderates accepted both these conditions with clenched teeth for the pleasure of becoming an established government party.

Two nonsocialist governments were rapidly eliminated because of nuclear power and the tax policy.

The largest obstacle to the nonsocialist opposition regaining the governing power lies in the lack of confidence of many voters in its ability to govern.

Most likely the nonsocialist opposition would profit collectively if it appointed Bengt Westerberg the nonsocialist prime minister candidate today. This would give added weight to the opposition and at the same time force the Social Democrats to choose its tactics before the election campaign.

It would surely be an advantage to both the Moderates and the Center Party. When the prime minister issue is solved, these parties could concentrate on their own issues, instead of carrying on an uncertain fight against Bengt Westerberg. The heavy responsibility of the nonsocialist opposition making a credible impression would then rest on Westerbergs shoulders.

Such a solution is impossible today. It hurts too much to give such a position to Bengt Westerberg, especially for the Moderates whose tradition it is to pick on and disdain the Liberal Party.

Therefore, the development in politics up to the election points towards a repeat of the traditional civil war between the nonsocialist parties over the volatile nonsocialist voters and it is possible that the Environmental Party will also enter the fray. This will happen even though the continuous cannibalism is the main surety for a continued social democratic power hegemony.

During the 1985 election campaign, Bengt Westerberg and Ulf Adelsohn called for a joint nonsocialist election manifesto, while Thorbjorn Falldin, with his dreams of revenge, did not want to join in.

Coming up on the 1988 election, there will still not be a joint nonsocialist election manifesto. Now it is primarily the leader of the Moderates, Carl Bildt, who is seeking personal revenge. At best there might be some joint declarations about family policy and ownership before the election campaign starts in earnest.

At this point, Carl Bildt, but also Olof Johansson, with not very encouraging opinion figures, want to keep all avenues open to strengthen their own party's position among the voters. Bildt wants to concentrate on taxes, defense and schools, while the Center is frantically looking for a platform.

The Nordic dream of a dominating right-wing party lives on in the Moderate Coalition Party. The Moderates really do not want to participate again in a nonsocialist government, which is dominated primarily by the Liberal Party and secondly by the center policy.

The Moderates feel that only a nonsocialist government dominated by the Moderates is capable of governing without repeating the opposition from 1976-1982. The error in thinking is only that then there will be no nonsocialist government, which was so clearly demonstrated by the 1985 election result.

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## DANGER OF DEPLETED COMBALTAP, NORWAY DEFENSES ANALYZED

Bonn LOYAL in German Jun 87 pp 18-20

[Article by Wolfgang Fechner: "Worries in Karup"]

[Text] Alarm bells are ringing at the NATO headquarters in Northern Europe: in Kolsaas near Oslo; in Karup, Denmark; and in Schleswig-Holstein's Rendsburg. Allies who until now had planned to send reinforcement troops to the northern flank in case of an emergency are now considering a retreat from this obligation for financial reasons. Ottawa for instance is publicly considering withdrawing from NATO planning the sea and air transportable 5,000-man brigade, which has been held in readiness for the last 20 years to reinforce the defense front in northern Norway. This creates a considerable gap in the defense line at the extreme northern flank of the Western alliance.

There is worry at BALTAP headquarters in Karup, Denmark, about British intentions no longer to maintain the United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF) in readiness for operations in the LANDJUT defense zone, but rather to shift the brigade to the operations zone of the First British Corps in Northern Germany, if a defense emergency were to require such reinforcement.

In London's view, the reasons for considering this are compelling. They are based on the unfavorable ratio between combat and support troops. Being an independent brigade, the UKMF's 7,000 combat troops require almost an equal number of support troops. If it were to operate with the First British Corps in Germany, the number of support troops could be reduced by partially converting them to combat troops.

For COMBALTAP, on the other hand, implementation of these proposals would mean a severe weakening of its early available defense force in Schleswig-Holstein's difficult terrain. While the Danish and Norwegian press has been extensively reporting on Canadian and British plans, these intentions have hardly been acknowledged in Germany outside of military circles, even though the state of Schleswig-Holstein would be the first to suffer from such a British decision. This also points up the difficult psychological situation of the Baltic Approaches Command: the German public is barely aware of its existence.

The northern flank of NATO is of great importance to the defense of Central Europe. It has one of the key positions in the Western defense organization. From the viewpoint of the Warsaw Pact, the Scandinavian allies Denmark and Norway form a barrier which constitutes an obstacle to free access to the Atlantic. Because the Scandinavian allies decided not to tolerate foreign military units on their soil in peacetime, and because they themselves cannot maintain sufficient forces for the defense of their territory owing to their small populations, this region is greatly dependent upon reinforcement from other member countries of the alliance in case of tension or defense emergency.

For this reason, 25 years ago NATO created an integrated command structure with staffs in Kolsaas, Karup and Rendsburg. These headquarters are responsible for managing a crisis program which would provide for a quick shift of troops from Canada, Great Britain and the United States to the defense zone. Weapons and equipment for these reinforcement troops are positioned in Norway and Denmark in peacetime also. Beyond that, NATO's mobile intervention force, in brigade strength and with air support, could be deployed for a short period in Norway or Denmark, if it is not needed elsewhere. However, the Warsaw Pact's superior potential would sustain only superficial damage in such an operation.

The military situation in northern Norway and at the approaches to the Baltic--both are sensitive points--is the key to the potential role of the Soviet fleet in sea warfare in the North Sea and the Atlantic. The buildup of Murmansk into the world's largest naval base and the large troop concentrations on the Kola peninsula are indications of the importance ascribed by the Warsaw Pact to NATO's northern flank. Should the USSR succeed in quickly overrunning the strategic key positions of NATO's northern flank and thus be able to combine its Arctic Ocean fleet with the naval units stationed in the Baltic, this would greatly imperil NATO's vital transatlantic connections. There is increasing worry in the Baltic approach area about how this important sector can be defended, if at all.

In case of crisis of armed conflict, Headquarters Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) would be the command post for allied land, air and naval forces charged with defending the area between the Elbe and Skagen. The commander of Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP) is the responsible NATO commander in the area of the Baltic approaches between Hamburg and the Skagerrak and from the waters of the North Sea to the Baltic coastline.

Discussions of the mission of this command generally involve the following questions:

- how effective is the deterrence
- what forces are available
- how are operations conducted in case of deployment?

In peacetime the headquarters in Karup, which is staffed by representatives of all the military services, fulfills the mission and assumes the responsibilities of a planning staff.



The main emphasis in peacetime planning is force and operational planning, drafting of international agreements with the German and Danish host countries, along with the planning and execution of major force exercises involving joint use of ground, air and naval forces as well as amphibious units.

A look at the map shows the insular and/or peninsular character of the Danish and Schleswig-Holstein territory between the North Sea and the Baltic. This not only imparts an amphibious structure to the COMBALTAP's area of responsibility, it also gives it its primary geostrategic significance as a bridge between Central and Northern Europe.

One of the significant operational aspects is the fact that more than one million Danes live in Copenhagen on the left flank of this command area. This certainly makes the Danish capital the most vulnerable capital of the NATO states. Apart from the Baltic, there is no approach area and no rear area. This eliminates any possibility of gaining time by giving up territory in delaying actions.

These same factors are true also for the right flank of the COMBALTAP's area, where more than one million Germans live just behind the interior German border in Hamburg, again without any operationally useful rear area. From a military viewpoint, the situation of Luebeck is even more unfavorable.

Where on the one hand COMBALTAP functions as a bridge between Central and Northern Europe, on the other hand, its control of the Baltic exists giving it control over one of the USSR's three strategic gates to NATO's Atlantic sealanes. As far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, BALTAP, with southern Norway and probably also with southern Sweden, constitutes the right flank of the West European front.

Gaining control of the Baltic approaches therefore remains a prerequisite for the Warsaw Pact, if it is to operate effectively against NATO sealanes. The great concentration of force in the Arctic ocean notwithstanding, its most important harbors, military bases, shipyards and resupply installations are spread out along more than 1,000 km of Warsaw Pact-controlled Baltic coastline.

Control of the Baltic approach area by the Warsaw Pact would provide the Soviet naval and air forces with direct access to the North Sea and, beyond that, the Atlantic. Jointly with the naval and air forces of the Northern Fleet, they could then disrupt NATO's Atlantic supply lines and thus prevent reinforcement and resupply for Europe.

Apart from this, and even prior to achieving complete control of this area, the Warsaw Pact would be able to penetrate the air space here in European NATO's "wasp waist" and to attack both the British Isles, which are important in the nuclear strategy, as well as southern Norway and targets in Central Europe. In this manner, the much more close-meshed air defense network in Central Europe could be solidly outflanked.

In Norway there is greater awareness of the dependence on NATO's sea defense than there is in Central Europe. Norwegian military keeps emphasizing that the security of the country, mobilization, and a shift of the bulk of Norwegian forces to northern Norway can be achieved only if there is a secure defense of the BALTAP area.

These interdependencies must be kept in mind, as well as the fact that operations against Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland and the Danish straits would always have direct and immediate impact upon Central Europe and the northern flank.

The armed forces under COMBALTAP consist of the Danish Jutland Division, the Bundeswehr's 6th Armored Infantry Division, the Danish Sea-land Division, all operational units of the FRG Navy, as well as other provisional reinforcements from other member states of the Alliance. BALTAP is always commanded by a Danish general or admiral; his deputy is always a German officer of equal rank. The staff is multinational and reflects the forces engaged in the defense of this area.

In peacetime, the commander of Ground Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (COMLANDJUT) is the only one to have combat troops under his command. Lieutenant General Henning von Ondarza is in command of the only multinational corps in NATO. His command area includes Schleswig-Holstein as well as parts of Jutland and Fuenen. In case of war, he would be reinforced by the FRG 6th Armored Infantry Division, the Danish Jutland Division and reinforcements to be brought in from England, The Netherlands and the United States.

Situation maps in Western headquarters indicate that the Warsaw Pact has accumulated an enormous potential for operations against the defenders of the Baltic approaches. The Baltic plays a central role in Warsaw Pact naval warfare planning. Apart from a great number of small and medium-sized combat units. About 50 percent of all Warsaw Pact amphibious units are stationed in the Baltic. Including air cushion vehicles, they total more than 100 ships of various sizes, capable of landing more than 6,000 fully equipped troops in a single wave.

Out of the approximately 700 combat aircraft of Warsaw Pact air forces stationed in the western USSR, in Poland and in the GDR, a considerable portion could be deployed in the battle for the Baltic approaches.

The preceding makes it abundantly clear that only sufficiently early warning and the timely arrival of overseas reinforcements would provide a possibility of resisting a Warsaw Pact aggression in this defense sector.

Lieutenant General Guenter Raulf, Deputy COMBALTAP, worries about the operational readiness level and equipment status of the Danish forces. As a result of Danish domestic political conditions, desirable improvements could not be achieved in the last few decades. In his opinion, this means that BALTAP is more dependent than ever upon the timely arrival of reinforcements. General Raulf is asking for a reexamination of the priorities of reinforcement

planning. If for the Central European defense sector the arrival of 10 divisions is planned within 10 days, the BALTAP area would require one additional division on the eleventh day to enable it to conduct a successful forward defense.

Lieutenant General Henning von Ondarza sees his LANDJUT corps area being threatened from two main directions. One he believes to be located between Luebeck and Hamburg and the other, the wet, deep flank, leads across the Baltic. As to their order of magnitude, the situation is about the same as that for Central Europe. One would have to count on strong conventional superiority, with the defender assuming that in the attack by the first operational echelons the ratio between the two forces would be relatively even.

General von Ondarza has immediate control of the FRG 6th Armored Infantry Division, which is the strongest division anywhere in NATO, and the Jutland Division, located in Denmark, which in a crisis situation would have to be brought forward next to the 6th Division. However, the Jutland Division is predominantly staffed by cadres and would require appropriate mobilization time.

Lieutenant General von Ondarza is very satisfied with the cooperation among the allied forces, which is constantly monitored in large corps exercises and smaller maneuvers.

One of the main problems of the northern flank consists of the fact that too few stationary combat units are present. The relatively thin air defense is another reason why Generals Raulf and von Ondarza worry. The LANDJUT commander sees another deficiency in the fact that he cannot avail himself of any corps resources, such as helicopters. Reconnaissance facilities at the disposal of the commander are very limited also. However, the capability of the allied naval forces for timely deployment of mine barriers to prevent a quick breakthrough by the Warsaw Pact through the Fehmarn Belt and the Danish straits is very highly regarded.

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## AIR FORCE ACTIVELY STUDYING REPLACEMENT FOR DRAGEN FIGHTER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jul 87 pp 1, 4

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Battle Over Fighter Sales to Denmark"]

[Text] General Dynamics is recommending that all NATO countries which utilize the F-16 fighter should join together in the development of a second generation F-16 with the name Agile Falcon, and is offering extensive joint-production and compensation.

The battle over who will sell planes to the new Danish air force already has begun. Three large plane manufacturers are competing over which of them will deliver planes costing between 1.6 and 2.4 billion kroner during the course of the 1990's.

"The new planes will replace the air force's Swedish built Draken fighter, of which the first half is to be replaced in the beginning of the 1990's, and the second half a few years later," advises the chief of the air force's materiel command, Major General J. Skjoth.

One of the three plane manufacturers still in the final stretch of the competition is General Dynamics from the United States, which builds the F-16 fighter.

The Americans advised yesterday that they will offer the original participants in "the world's largest plane transaction"--Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway and the United States--close cooperation in connection with a new second generation F-16 by the name Agile Falcon, with extensive agreements for cooperative production.

"It is a project which I expect to hear more about when I go to the United States next week to discuss the possibilities for potential delivery of more F-16 fighters--new or used," states Major General J. Skoth.

The other two manufacturers are the Swedish plane manufacturer SAAB, with its JAS 39 Gripen, which exists only as a prototype and which never has flown yet.

Finally, the French fighter, Mirage 2000, is in the picture as one of the three planes which satisfy the Danish air force's needs and specifications.

## Modernized F-16's Possibly Satisfactory

New fighter planes are not stock items. Therefore the armed forces already are actively involved in preparations for the replacement of the Swedish built Draken fighters which will become obsolete in the next decade.

The Danish air force is actively involved in investigating which plane will be chosen as the successor to the old Swedish Draken fighters which will be ripe for replacement in the course of the next decade.

"New fighter planes are not stock items. It easily can take 8-10 years to find the type which satisfies most of the requirements which have been established for a new plane. And there also will be an additional 3-4 years for deliveries of the first plane," states the chief of the air force materiel command, Major General J. Skjoth.

There is seeming political agreement on strengthening the air defenses of Denmark. Therefore, the armed forces command some time ago requested the air force to look at which type plane might be considered as the replacement for the Draken.

"The list originally included seven plane models, which rather quickly became limited to four," advises Major General Skjoth.

"Those four are General Dynamics' F-16, Saab's JAS 39, the French Mirage, and Northrup's F-20 Tiger Shark, which was dropped when the manufacturer gave up on developing the project further.

Two planes--the joint European EFA and the French Rafale--were dropped because of cost, while the Israeli plane, Lavi, was dropped because it is doubtful whether it will be produced.

General Skjoth does not believe that it will be a catastrophe if the air force must "be satisfied" with used F-16 planes, inherited from a country which has the means to buy newer planes.

Modernized F-16 fighters would be able to last another 15 years, and there is no reason to pay for expensive new equipment which is capable of doing many things for which we have no use.

The only thing which is regrettable is that all of the air force's fighters will become outdated at the same time.

Following the evaluation of what is available on the market, efforts now have begun by way of investigation of that market, and the result of this investigation is expected to be available before the end of September.

The investigation involves ascertaining the extent of political backing which can be counted on for the acquisitions, the operative requirements, when delivery can occur, the cost of the planes, the manner of payment, and the degree to which the manufacturer is able to effectuate our limited order--viewed from an international perspective. Last but not least is the matter of cooperative production and compensatory purchases which can be anticipated.



"Prior to the beginning of October, we expect to know the cost of the acquisition of the new planes, with a variance of plus/minus five percent in 1987 prices," states Major General Skjoth.

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## BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY URGES COUNTRY INCREASE ARMS SPENDING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jul 87 p 10

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Armed Forces too Weak"]

[Text] During his official visit to Copenhagen yesterday, the British Foreign Secretary said right out that NATO would benefit if Denmark increased its defense spending.

"Great Britain spends a good five percent of its gross national product on defense. Denmark spends about two percent. That can be an answer."

Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, chose this way of answering when he was asked yesterday during an official visit in Copenhagen whether he believed that Denmark is contributing its share of the joint defense costs of NATO.

Earlier this year, Great Britain considered making changes in its forces so that the British reinforcement troops, which are earmarked for Denmark in case of a crisis, would be sent to West Germany instead. The reason was to effect savings, but the change never amounted to anything due to political pressure.

Both in discussions with both Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative) and Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal), and at the subsequent press conference, Sir Geoffrey Howe emphasized the good relations between Denmark and Great Britain.

Sir Geoffrey said that the relations are so good that it has been five years since a British foreign minister last made an official visit in Copenhagen, but that the cooperation through EC had created new frequent and close contacts.

"I meet Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and other EC foreign ministers now more frequently than I see some of my British government colleagues. And my wife sometimes complains that I eat dinner more often with EC foreign ministers than with her."

The central point in the negotiations and in Sir Geoffrey's dinner speech, however, was NATO's situation at the point in time when there is a prospect of an East-West agreement on removal of short- and medium-range missiles in Europe.

"In NATO, we now are discussing how we best can utilize our resources. Great Britain places the greatest significance on security in the entrances to the Baltic, and we will not reduce that security. But as your ally, we will continue to have the greatest attention directed toward your contribution. I am certain--and forgive me for saying so--that the NATO alliance would benefit from greater Danish resources," Sir Geoffrey Howe said.

The British Foreign Secretary asserted that the European members of NATO now have a greater responsibility for joint security, and the relationship between the United States and Europe in the alliance will be strengthened and not weakened if the Europeans do more for their own defense.

"As with everything good, this also will not come easily. Or cheaply. To channelize European resources into defense, will require even more difficult decisions," said Sir Geoffrey Howe.

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## MISSION, STRUCTURE, INVENTORY OF NAVAL AIR ARM DETAILED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German May 87 pp 30-34

[Article by Comm Karl Kuhl, Naval Air Division Staff: "Naval Aviators--Party Of a Balanced Fleet"]

[Text] German naval aviators--organizationally combined into the Naval Air Division--"conduct naval warfare from the air." For this purpose, they have at their disposal a large number of weapon systems--from small on board helicopters up to the TORNADO naval fighter-bombers equipped with wide-ranging missiles. Commander Karl Kuhl, from of the Naval Air Division staff, discusses the mission, the organization, and the weapon systems of the naval air arm, and describes their planning intentions for the future.

Next year, German naval aviators will celebrate the 75th anniversary of their founding. On 1 June 1913, as the result of a decision made by the Kaiser in consultation with his cabinet, the order was given to set up a "Naval Air Detachment" in Putzig (near Danzig). Although its missions were at first limited to reconnaissance sorties, these were expanded to include combat missions during the course of World War I, because of the rapid development of this new naval warfare weapon. The Versailles Treaty subsequently banned any type of military air activity. After its reactivation in the 1930's, a decisive turn of events occurred when, expectations and strong resistance by the Navy, notwithstanding, responsibility for the conduct of naval warfare from the air was taken over by the new military service branch--the Air Force. During the course of World War II, this decision led to the failure of potentially successful naval operations.

Based upon these experiences and oriented toward the example of Western navies during the reactivation of the Bundeswehr it was decided to once again integrate naval air forces into the fleet as a basic element. Former General Staff Colonel Gaul, now a Navy captain, placed into service the Command of Naval Aviators--later the Naval Air Command--from which the Naval Air Division was created in 1969. With that, reactivation of the naval air forces was essentially completed.

In the Naval Air Division, all the Navy's aviation resources are organized into four Naval Air Groups. With some 7,000 men, the Naval Air Division is the largest and most powerful special command in the fleet.

## A Wide Mission Spectrum

The mission of the naval air arm must be considered in connection with the Navy's overall mission. It is the mission of the Navy both to defend FRG territory against attacks upon the coasts and at sea, and to contribute to the NATO strategy of deterrence by providing effective and tenacious forward defense. therefore, the Navy's area of operation is to solve the following problems:

--Defend the key position of "Baltic Sea approaches,"

--Protect the sea areas for the loading and transportation of reinforcements and supplies, and

--Deny Soviet naval forces access to the Atlantic Ocean.

"In the conduct of modern naval warfare, there is almost no mission to which aircraft do not contribute, either directly or indirectly." This statement by the former Navy commander-in-chief Admiral (ret) Guenter Luther describes the sweeping importance of the naval air forces. It becomes clear that the naval air forces do not have any isolated independent mission. Their tasks devolve from the Navy's mission; they are imbedded in the fleet's tasks; and they are related exclusively to the conduct of naval warfare.

For the naval air forces, this means in summary: Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance of sea areas, defense against surface naval forces, defense against submarines, search-and-rescue duties and transportation of personnel and materiel.

The aerial weapon system for carrying out these tasks, their equipment and armament, as well as the training of their crews are all tailored to the requirements imposed by naval warfare. It follows naturally from this that those missions which are normally assigned to military air forces--such as air defense, air support for ground forces, defense against enemy air power, etc.--are not to be carried out by naval air forces. These are intrinsic missions of the air force.

In the area of air defense--except for self-defense--the Navy is also dependent upon the air forces in the Alliance.

Just like destroyers, fast patrol boats, minesweepers and underwater demolition teams, aerial weapon systems are part of a "balanced fleet." Naval aircraft are naval warfare resources. Generally stated, the mission of the naval air arm thus reads: "conduct of naval warfare from the air" and not "aerial warfare above the sea."

## Four Naval Air Groups

Like all other special commands, the Naval Air Division is subordinate to the fleet's commander-in-chief. The commanding officer of the Naval Air Division



is responsible to the fleet's commander-in-chief for establishment and maintenance of the state of combat-readiness of the units under his command. In this way, it is guaranteed that unified command of all naval warfare resources--and the resulting unlimited control over use of the naval air arm--is assigned to a single commander-in-chief. (See Fig 1)

Figure 1. Special Commands Subordinate to the Fleet Commander-in-Chief

#### Fleet Commander-in-Chief

Amphibious Craft  
Supply Ships  
Submarines  
Fast Patrol Boats  
Minesweepers  
Destroyers

Naval Air Division:  
Naval Air Group 1 (MFG 1)  
Naval Air Group 2 (MFG 2)  
Naval Air Group 3 (MFG 3)  
Naval Air Group 5 (MFG 5)

The staff consists of the classic admiral staff sections for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications, as well as the special for flight safety, medical services, administration and geophysics. There are four Naval Air Groups (MFG) subordinate to the Naval Air Divisions:

1. Naval Air Group 1 (MFG 1) in Schleswig-Jagel with barracks in Kropp. The group has two squadrons, equipped with TORNADO fighter-bombers.
2. Naval Air Group 2 (MFG 2) in Eggebek. The barracks are located in Tarp. Since the fall of 1986 this group has been in the process of re-equipping with the TORNADO. This will be completed in early 1988.
3. Naval Air Group 3 (MFG 3) "Graf Zeppelin" in Nordholz. Two of its squadrons have 19 Breguet ATLANTIC aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and long-range naval reconnaissance. A 3d squadron, has 14 sea LYNX MK 88 on board helicopters, which are assigned to frigate 122. Upon delivery of 2 additional frigates still under construction, the number of helicopters will rise to a total of 19.
4. Naval Air Group 5 (MFG 5) in Kiel-Holtenau with a squadron of 22 SEA KING MK 41 helicopters and a 2nd squadron with 20 Dornier Do-28 D SKYSERVANT transport and liaison aircraft.

Each group has some 1,700 men--about 300 in the Aviation Battalion, 950 in the Technical Battalion, and 450 in the Air Base Battalion. In addition, there are some 400 civilians employees.

Each air group is commanded by a Commodore under whom there are an air group staff and three battalion-sized units--which are in turn broken down into various units. (See Fig 2)

Figure 2. Organizational Chart for a Naval Air Group

Commodore		
Air Group Staff		
Aviation Battalion	Technical Battalion	Air base Battalion
1st Squadron	Maintenance/Weapons Squadron	Heavy Naval Security Company
2nd Squadron	Repair	Air Defense Squadron
3rd Squadron	Electronics Squadron	Motor Vehicle Squadron
Air Operations	Supply	Medical Services Squadron
Geophysics		Runway Repair Squadron
Air Base Fire Department		Naval Security Company

#### Weapon Systems

Technical progress and the development of modern weapon systems during the last 25 years has not spared the naval air arm either. During this time a third generation of combat aircraft has been delivered to the air group.

#### TORNADO

With the introduction of the Panavia TORNADO navy fighter-bomber, the naval air forces obtained a significant increase in combat capability owing to: the two-man concept, a significantly more extensive weapon-carrying capacity, either greater operating range or more on station time in the deployment area.

The mission of the navy fighter-bombers--equipped with KORMORAN antiship missiles, with a missile for attacking radar devices, and with bombs--is to destroy enemy surface naval forces, especially protected landing units. The capability of the TORNADO to defend itself against enemy fighter aircraft through use of air-to-air missiles increases its penetration ability. The complexity of the TORNADO weapon system requires especially intensive training for its crew, a pilot and a weapon systems officer. A high degree of effectiveness is obtained through full utilization of the complex programmable navigation and attack system, the flexibility of the entire system, and the self-defense resources. With respect to its performance and flight

characteristics, the TORNADO is optimized for low-level flight under all weather conditions. Concerning its combat radius in low-level flight operations, it can be roughly summarized that the TORNADO--in comparison with the predecessor F-104G STARFIGHTER--can carry the same weapon load twice the distance.

#### ATLANTIC

The Breguet ATLANTIC, whose combat capability has been increased in the last 3 years, has in addition to the necessary sensors for anti-submarine warfare, a modern radar device, an accurate inertial navigation system and a computer-supported installation for electronic reconnaissance at its disposal. This equipment enables the crew to obtain an accurate picture of the situation. In this regard, the ATLANTIC operates as a long-range navy reconnaissance aircraft. As such, the ATLANTIC is armed with torpedos and depth charges. With this system the air group can continue to carry out its mission into the 1990's.

#### SEA LYNX

The mission of the on board helicopters is to detect and attack enemy submarines beyond the detection range of their own surface units. For this purpose, the helicopters are equipped with submersible sonar devices, radar devices, and anti-submarine attack torpedos. At the same time--with their capability to transmit target information--they enable their own surface units to make full use of the maximum range of on board missiles, whose range is greater than the ships' own target acquisition range.

#### SEA KING

Naval Air Group 5 (MFG 5) has the mission of carrying out both rescue operations and transportation and liaison flights. The First Squadron, equipped with the Westland SEA KING MK 41 helicopter, carries out search-and-rescue (SAR) assignments in both the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. First aid to and transportation of injured--well beyond the military area of activity--also belong to the tasks of the aircraft and aircrews assigned to SAR duty. The deployment process is directed from the SAR Command Post in Navy fleet headquarters to the helicopters stationed in both Kiel-Holtenau and the outlying stations of Helgoland, Borkum, and Sylt.

In 1986 Navy helicopters were deployed in 102 air and sea emergency operations. In these and other SAR operations, the SEA KING helicopters flew 578 hours, of which 353--or about 60 percent--were for civilian clients alone.

It is envisioned that by the end of this year the SEA KING will be re-equipped as a helicopter which can take on combat missions. Plans call for arming the helicopter with SEA SKUA missiles in order to be able to attack light surface units and to use it as an elevated target acquisition platform in tactical-operational coordination with missile-firing fast patrol boats. The re-equipping includes: installation of modern radar equipment, arming with


missiles, capability for automatic transmission of target information, installation of a radar warning receiver.

#### SKYSERVANT

The Dornier Do-28 D SKYSERVANT is used by the Second Squadron for the transportation of both personnel and materiel. Since January 1986, two specially-equipped Do-28 aircraft have been used to monitor the main shipping routes in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea for environmental polluters. During 187 sorties in 1986, 125 acts of water pollution were found and, in eight cases, the perpetrator was caught.

Note: See Fig. 3 for deployment of the Naval Air Division. Outlying stations are located at Sylt, Helgoland, and Borkum for SEA KING search -and-rescue helicopters. SEA LYNX helicopters from Nordholz are stationed in Wilhelmshaven aboard BREMEN-class frigates of the Fourth Frigate Squadron.

Figure 3. Deployment of the FRG Naval Air Division



Key:

1. E = Westerland--Naval Air Training Battalion
2. Eggebek--Naval Air Group 2
3. Schleswig-Jagel--Naval Air Group 1
4. Kiel-Holtenau--Naval Air Division Headquarters; Naval Air Group 5
5. Nordholz--Naval Air Group 3 "Graf Zeppelin"

Further Modernization of Equipment

Naval aviators must meet the quantitative superiority of the Soviet Baltic Fleet with a qualitative advantage in both weapons and weapon systems. In order to ensure this for the future as well, the following developments and procurements are envisioned for the 1990's and beyond:

The TORNADO weapon system will remain in use into the next century, but it must be modified step-by-step to fit contemporary threats. The major part of the procurements will lie in the weapons area with measures designed to improve combat capabilities. The development of both more modern and powerful missiles and of additional free-falling weapons has already begun.

The technical status of the ATLANTIC and its improved sensor equipment--which was achieved through improvements in combat capability--will allow it to be deployed until the middle of the 1990's. However, in comparison with the weapon systems of NATO partners, a technological inferiority has come about. In response to this, a replacement system--to be procured for the middle of the 1990's--was considered in the 1988 Bundeswehr plan and was approved in December 1986 as a "military-tactical objectives" (MTZ). The MTZ identifies two competing weapon systems: The Dassault-Breguet ATLANTIC MK2 and the Lockheed P-3G ORION. The decision concerning selection of the replacement system is expected to be made in 1988. A total of 18 aircraft will be purchased, with delivery starting in the mid-1990's.

The navy is now working on a multinational development project related to replacements for the helicopters currently in Navy service. Its goal is to obtain the greatest possible degree of standardization. The definition phase began this year and will last 10 months. Procurement will include on board helicopters for deployment on frigates and attack helicopters as a replacement for the SEA KING. This will guarantee that naval aviators will be able to carry out their mission in the future just as they have in the past. With their capabilities to deal flexibly and to react quickly, they are a significant delivery system in the conduct of naval warfare, the framework of a "balanced fleet."

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## PROCUREMENT NEEDS FOR NEW AIRBORNE ASW WEAPON SYSTEMS LISTED

36200289 Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jun 87 pp 52-59

[Article by Udo Thenhausen: "Air-Based Antisubmarine Operations in the Navy: Thoughts on the Impending Procurement Program"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction; boxed material as indicated]

[Text] In the 1990's, the German Navy faces the procurement of new weapon systems for antisubmarine operations: the land-based submarine fighters and long-range reconnaissance aircraft (MPA--maritime patrol aircraft) and the onboard Naval Helicopter 90. Proceeding from some historical considerations and the special problems of the German area of operations, diplomate physicist Udo Thenhausen, chief of system integration programs in the aeronautical area with the firm Dornier, puts several demands on the sensory analysis of these weapon systems and explains the interrelationships in the equipment of aircraft and helicopter as they are being examined above all by Dornier.

Shortly after an Austrian Lohner flying boat sank the French submarine "Foucault" in September 1916, the experts became aware of a weapon system whose development had begun as early as 1911.

As early as June 1912, the British Royal Air Force carried out the first tests for air-based antisubmarine operations and in March 1915 it introduced a "Submarine Scout" airship for the task. A BE-2 biplane armed with two 50-kg bombs hung under this airship. This first "maritime patrol aircraft" was followed in May 1918 by the organization of six formations with De Havilland 6's in Great Britain.

The 233 submarines of the warring countries at the start of World War I and the further submarine warfare made sensor developments for submarine detection necessary in the years that followed, developments that after successful ship-based tests were soon introduced in the larger and larger air fleets for antisubmarine operations. Great Britain took the lead here as well, especially in the radar and sonar area.

These early developments were continued without interruption. As early as 1941, an American Liberator had the following performance data:

--11,350 liters of fuel,

- 1,100 miles from the base, 16 hours mission time,
- four 20-mm guns,
- six movable 7.6-mm machine guns,
- six 115-kg bombs,
- antisubmarine sensors (sonar, radar, MAD [magnetic anomaly detector], searchlight)

and thus defined for the first time the necessary outlay with respect to takeoff weight, armament, sensory analysis and other aircraft performance data. The framework thereby established for the personnel and financial expenditure for a MPA is still valid today and is finding its provisional conclusion in the weapon systems P-3C Orion and BR-1150 Atlantique 2, for example.

Today, just as before, the obviousness of this expenditure is being put into question again and again, for it is tempting to increase the number of floating units instead of maintaining a fleet of MPA's, thereby probably attaining more combat effectiveness. But the results of World War II show the effectiveness of the sea-area surveillance and antisubmarine aircraft, because of the 1,162 German submarines employed, 727 were destroyed--288 by aircraft, 47 through the cooperative efforts of aircraft and ships, and 80 through bombing raids in the port. Thus, almost 60 percent of the fleet was put out of action by aircraft or through their participation.

For the German Federal Navy, the MPA is an indispensable weapon system merely because of the geopolitical situation, especially in peacetime as well. For it makes valuable contributions to the assessment of the situation through the possibility of an extensive reconnaissance of the movements of submarines and surface ships.

#### **Demands on Sensory Analysis**

German sea-area reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters are operating in the North Sea and Baltic Sea as well as in the Norwegian Sea. These areas of operations are characterized by:

#### **Special environmental conditions:**

- extension and water depths,
- changing nature of the sea bottom,
- temporally and geographically varying salt strata,
- conditions of the currents (Baltic outlets),
- weather (fog, precipitation, gales 10 percent of the year, heavy sea);

#### **Other special features:**

- more than 250 wrecks,

--about 190 petroleum and gas drilling sites (see Figure 1),  
--pipelines and cables.

Geopolitical situation:

--high threat situation through submarines, surface ships and combat aircraft.



Figure 1. Numerous Gas and Oil Drilling Sites Influence the Optimum Use of Acoustic and Magnetic Sensors in the Area of Operations of the German Federal Navy.

Key:

1. Oil drilling
2. Gas drilling
3. Oil pipelines
4. Gas pipelines

With these boundary conditions, the navy has an antisubmarine scenario that may well be unique (difficult!) and that must effect the choice of sensors, data management, armament and self-protection.

Encouraged by contacts with the U.S. Naval Air System Command, Dornier has attempted to simulate the outlined problems of the operational area and thus to specify sensor requirements. It soon became apparent, however, that this simulation remains doubtful in its results and is unacceptable in a market economy.

Too many parameters influence the simulation result and especially the sound propagation in shallow water under varying salt strata (from 10 parts per thousand in the fjord area to 35 parts per thousand in the North Sea), different sea bottom characteristics and in part difficult surface conditions (gales) ultimately do not permit "exact" results but do make possible the indication of trends.

#### Sonar

The active/passive acoustic submarine detection is influenced by, among other things, the sources of interference in the water. Besides the unforeseeable sound propagation in the shallow water area, the surface traffic (there are as many as 3,000 ship movements hourly in the different waterways in the reconnaissance area of our navy) and the drilling sites influence the exact locating of submarines.

The number of sources of interference declines from south to north, that is, the demands on the sonar processor and buoys as well as their hydrophones vary. A start has been made on resolving the outlined problems. Through a hydrophone combination, the British BARRA buoy accomplishes a special directivity pattern that increases the detection probability under the outlined conditions.

With the vertical/horizontal hydrophone arrangement, the U.S. firm Hazeltine is NEIC) in Beijing said that no decision on terms had been taken. The necessary increase in the number of buoys leads to special demands on the aircraft receiver and sonar processor. The GEC system AN/ASQ 903 is an outstanding type representative of this new processor generation.

There is hardly any available experience on the suitability of the outlined buoy systems for the requirements of the federal navy. A test program for the different processors and buoy types could certainly give information on the performance capability of the individual systems. In addition, these buoys are about 50 times more expensive than, for example, the classic LOFAR buoys and are not absolutely necessary in the northern section of the operational area. So here a reasonable mix of classic and modern buoys is needed.

#### Magnetic Sensor

More than 250 wrecks and the drilling sites and associated cable connections and pipelines deform the magnetic field in the operational area of the MPA and naval helicopters. Intensive talks with MAD producers showed that the classic magnetic sensor is not, for example, able to separate a submarine "parked" behind a wreck and thus to detect it.

MAD gradiometer configurations could be a new solution. But there is no corresponding new experience in Europe. In any case, the system architecture of the MPA and naval helicopters is to be designed so that the most up-to-date sensors can be retrofitted in later years. (SCUIDS = super conducted interference devices).

#### Radar

Besides the detecting of surface naval and air targets, the radar sensor also serves to detect submarines. As the smallest target dimension, therefore, the radar cross section of a submarine snorkel or periscope determines the design of the radar. Here as well, the named environmental conditions influence the performance capability of the sensor. The shallow-water waves and the weather-related roughness in the North and Baltic seas require an increased capability of the radar to suppress sea clutter that in the future as well will permit detection of the declining radar cross section (there is stealth technology here as well) of the snorkel or periscope.

Besides the influences on the sonar/MAD/radar sensors, the difficult conditions of the operational area also influence the choice of other sensors (e.g. ESM electronic support measures and FLIR forward looking infrared = thermal imagers), the self-protection concept (active/passive), and the armament (shallow-water torpedo). The command and weapon employment system on board the aircraft or helicopter and the information display should likewise take these problems into account.

The reduced detection capability of the individual sensor makes necessary an automatic correlation of the individual bits of information acquired. The operator console UDACS developed by Boeing and the MODOS (modular operator station) console being developed by Dornier make this possible.

Summarizing it can be said that the geopolitical and geophysical conditions of the area of operations of a future German MPA and naval helicopter necessitate sensors and system architectures that take into account these limiting conditions. The competition initiated between Atlantic and Orion for the MPA is supposed to lead to the purchase of one of these weapon systems "from the rack." This remains unsatisfactory from the engineer's point of view.

In the offered form, both weapon systems were originally designed for the "blue-water operations" of the French or American Navy and therefore do not take into account the problems of the North and Baltic seas in all areas. Adaptive developments are therefore necessary in any case and must be carried out to optimize the mission equipment.

#### MPA-90 Procurement

The German Navy has taken the outlined problems into account and raised the efficiency of the weapon system through an upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the sensors radar, sonar and ESM of the aircraft BR-1150 Atlantic now being introduced. Because of the working life of the airframe, this aircraft will have to be phased out in the mid-1990's and replaced by a successor.



Parallel to the upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the Atlantic, Dornier was early in presenting possible solutions for a MPA-90 and, with the concept "AMPAC" (Advanced Maritime Patrol Aircraft Concept), proposed a weapon system that on the one hand takes into account the almost 30 years of positive experiences with the Atlantic airframe and, on the other hand, with the corresponding up-to-date (U.S., British and French) sensors complies with the special German requirements.

After the U.S. Government was not prepared to grant the export license for U.S. sensors and systems to be built into non-American aircraft, despite the intensive efforts of German Government offices, this proposal had to be discarded, notwithstanding its military and technical advantages. Not least, the limited development budget was also a reason for this development. Dornier is now cooperating with Dassault. Both firms are currently preparing an MPA proposal that is derived from the Atlantique 2 to be introduced in France beginning in 1989 and that takes into account the requirements of the German Navy. In principle, there are two possibilities in this connection:

--further development of French sensors that may not have optimum suitability. These sensors are supposed to be further developed with German industry. Through the cooperation of the German and French navies, the equipment can then be used in both countries.

--implementation of sensors available in the market, resulting in cessation of sensor development activities. Among those available here are the sensors of the upgraded Atlantic (utilization of the developed logistics). The further-developed Texas Instruments APS-137 radar set and the already mentioned sonar processor AN/ASQ 903 would be ideal candidate sensors for this approach.

The further utilization of the Atlantic continues an early European cooperative program. The organizations established by the governments and industry remain intact. The infrastructures of the squadron and industry that have arisen over the long term are likewise already a financial contribution to the MPA-90 procurement.

#### Interrelations Between the MPA and the Naval Helicopter

The Naval Helicopter 90 is to be a multinational development. The airframe is the planned NATO Helicopter 90. The four European helicopter firms (Agusta, Aerospatiale, MBB and Westland), reinforced by Fokker, have undertaken an appropriate conceptual study. The firms ESG and Dornier have defined the national mission equipment and system architecture. Both studies are now being harmonized.

The hangar of the frigate Class 122 determines the designed size and thus the takeoff mass of the naval helicopter. Here too, the limiting geophysical conditions of the operational area require extensive sensor analysis adapted to the conditions. The limitations in the airframe can be harmonized with the sensor requirements only through an optimum system architecture and the use of modular operator consoles.

The MPA and naval helicopter will be introduced in the mid-1990's. They will be operated in the same squadron in the same area of operations and, in the final analysis, have identical or very similar tasks.

This parallelism provides the unique chance of harmonizing the equipment concepts. Both weapon systems can be equipped with the same sensors or with sensors of the same family.

The advantages of such an approach are especially obvious for the utilization phase. For example:

- joint warehousing of spare parts, expendable items and airdropped goods,
- identical installations for repair of equipment,
- documentation/training,
- sonar and ESM (radar-warning receiver), ground stations,
- software care.

The investigations carried out by Dornier in a parallel manner for MPA-90 and MH-90 on equipment compatibility confirm this possibility impressively.

After Westland had to drop out of the NATO Helicopter-90 team at the beginning of April 1987, the German-French axis for the MH-90 will certainly become stronger. Thus, in connection with a possible acquisition of the Atlantique 2, the German Ministry of Defense has the opportunity to harmonize both weapon systems and thereby to save financial resources.

#### Cooperation of Industry

The results of World War II outlined at the outset were not only the results of the combat of military commands. It was also the conflict of industries and scientific institutes. The Germans met the sensor developments being advanced on the side of the allies with modifications on the submarine (snorkel, propulsion unit, series construction). In the electronics area, the radar-warning receiver NAXOS was developed merely as a response to the radar threat. That is a situation that has not changed to this day. German submarines enjoy a high reputation, there are no national sensors for air-based antisubmarine operations. The above-described German-French cooperation in the area of antisubmarine operations presents itself as a way of improving this situation.

With an estimated need for about 100 MPA's/marine helicopters, it does indeed make sense to develop sensors further with the French and to give the German sensor industry the foundation for future developments. The precondition, of course, is the French willingness to cooperate. A European one-way street does not serve the cause.

In the future as well, antisubmarine operations will occupy an outstanding position within the German Navy. The threats are changing and will become

more sophisticated in the technical area. This growing challenge can be met only through the closer cooperation of all those involved. The dialogue between the navy, shipyards, sensor industry and aircraft industry should be taken up and carried out regularly. Through the suitable setting of the course in the programs MPA-90 and MH-90, the Ministry of Defense can force this cooperation and improve the national capabilities in the area of air-based antisubmarine operations in the middle term.

[Boxed material by W.F., p 57]

#### MPA-90: Tough Competition

The Federal Navy has long been planning to replace the Atlantic 1 with 18 MPA-90's (Maritime Patrol Aircraft 90) in the 1990's and for this purpose it has already undertaken several market screenings. Of the four original candidates--the military version of the small Airbus A-320 (MBB), Atlantique 2 (Dassault), P-3C Orion (Lockheed) and AMPAC (Atlantique airframe with American mission-equipment package, proposed by Dornier)--the Atlantique 2 and the Orion were chosen for their price and other reasons, so that competition still prevails in the definition phase.

The Atlantique 2 is offered by the consortium Dornier/Dassault, which has now opened an office in Koblenz for these activities. Dornier, once partner of Dassault in the building of the Atlantic 1, is now already participating in the production of 42 Atlantique 2's for the French Navy with about 20 percent of the airframe work, which, after all, amounts to 1.6 million man-hours. This is certainly also a factor that should play a role in the decision Orion or Atlantique, just as is the fact that Naval Air Group 3 can be converted more easily from Atlantic 1 to Atlantique 2 than from Atlantic 1 to Orion.

The P-3C Orion is being offered by MBB; on 28 April, the firm entered into an analogous agreement with Lockheed. For this aircraft, it should be interesting to see who in the summer will be awarded the contract from the U.S. Navy for the so-called Update IV, the latest mission equipment: the competitors are Lockheed and Boeing. Selection of the Orion by the German Navy would ensure great communality with the Orion's of the U.S. Navy operating in the same North Sea region.

The program is still in the definition phase, but heretofore there has not been an industrial contracting authority for this phase. The navy and agencies themselves are currently preparing a specification for the required performance of aircraft, mission equipment, data processing and ground operations office. This specification is supposed to be turned over to the firms in the spring of 1988 and they are to answer it within 2 months, so that a decision by Hardthoehe is to be expected for the end of 1988. The winning consortium is then supposed to come up with a short final definition before beginning the development phase. In accordance with current planning, the introduction of the MPA-90 is to be expected to begin in 1995.

Naturally neither the Orion nor the Atlantique 2 can be taken over unchanged. Adaptive developments by the German contractor are indispensable, for the requirements of the German Navy with its special area of operations in the

North Sea and Baltic Sea are naturally different from those of the so-called "blue-ocean" navies of the United States and France. An official requirement continues to be 100-percent compensation, within the program if possible. Both Dornier and MBB are naturally attempting to bring in the German electronics and equipment industry and this has met with resistance at times. The French, for example, showed little inclination to allow their Atlantique to be "Germanized." It is still unclear the extent to which American mission equipment, for example, even from the Update IV, can be used in a German Atlantique 2. Initially the U.S. Department of Defense rejected this: U.S. avionics in a U.S. aircraft only! But here as well, the last word has probably not yet been spoken. In any case, the German decision will be subject to political influences within the alliance.

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## RESERVE UNIT TRAINING INTENSIFIES, PROBLEMS SURFACE

Bonn LOYAL in German Jan 87 pp 20-21

[Article by Inge Dose-Kron: "The Sleeping Giant Hears Reveille"]

[Text] It is already dark but that does not bother the soldiers in their sweaty work: they are heaving the parts of a dismountable end ramp onto the track of the Oberheutal loading station near Muensingen. They must work quickly so that the tracked and wheeled vehicles that have just arrived on a freight train can soon have ground under their own chassis. The loading and unloading times are weak phases in defense readiness.

The ramp is ready for operations in 35 minutes. A record time, when one realizes that these soldiers are reservists and have put together an end ramp for the first time. To be sure, active forces do the precision driving so as to get over the ramp with no "slips." But that is meaningless for the successful employment of the reserve duty trainees.

Whenever possible, the army resorts to the railroad and to loading with end ramps so as to transfer major items of equipment to the site of operations. In this way, the material is protected to the extent possible, just as the roads and highways are kept from being damaged.

A hospital train, unique in the Bundeswehr, stands on the other side of the railroad platform. Reservists of the medical unit carry wounded inside. The compartments and Pullmans in the former Intercity train have been converted into "sickrooms." The train has two locomotives, one to pull it and the other to supply power. An operation car for the initial care of the most severely wounded is coupled between the two engines, as is a kitchen car.

The latter was rebuilt and equipped for about DM4 million. Everything sparkles and glitters in "stainless-steel" quality and even dietary food can be prepared in an optimum manner here. But the best item is an efficient water purification system. It converts the smallest rain puddle into potable liquid. If one takes a look, however, at the lockable built-in cooking pots, integrated ranges, etc., then one gets the impression that it is not so much a matter of special designs but of normal commercial equipment for large kitchens. And the question arises as to what, besides the purification system, can be so expensive.



But that does not have to concern the units of the territorial army. Paramount is their operational readiness to ensure in a state of defense and in accordance with their mission the operational freedom of the NATO army groups in the rear area. It is not easy to achieve this operational readiness. For up to now the territorial army, as a component of our armed forces dependent upon a mobilization, has been a stepchild of the Bundeswehr. "In many shortcomings, the late birth of the territorial army can still be felt. Because of the additional tasks at this time, it is overtaxed and considers itself neglected relative to the field army." This is how Deputy Army Chief of Staff Lt Gen Wolfgang Malecha marks out the difficulties of the territorial army. At the Muensingen training area in Schaebische Alb, Malecha showed through the example of the units of the Southern Territorial Command that a good start has been made toward resolving the problem.

With the tasks that the territorial army must fulfill, according to General Malecha, "one must see that it comprises only 10 percent of the actual wartime strength. That is only about 47,000 men. So one can say that the territorial army is a sleeping giant that must be awakened, because the mobilization for 500,000 reservists must be prepared and carried out." If one adds the Wartime Host Nation Support Troop, then the number even exceeds 600,000. And this in the light of the years with few births....

Maj Gen Gerhard Brugmann, commander-in-chief of the Southern Territorial Command, pointed out that in his area alone more than 1,400 units and duty stations must be organized in a state of defense. Since the Southern Territorial Command has a peacetime strength of about 20,000 men, it must therefore increase by about 250,000 reservists.

The extent to which they are truly operationally ready is a question of the quality of their training. Can it be achieved when the soldiers of the reserve train for 2 weeks about every 2 years? Brugmann: "That is an absolute minimum, barely acceptable from a military point of view." But the "sleeping giant" has heard the call of reveille. Not only that active soldiers and reservists can now "work with each other" better, because they are becoming more conscious of one another. The reservists themselves are showing, for the most part, more interest in their own training and advanced training, which is being offered more and more. In addition, many future reserve soldiers are purposefully being trained during their tour of duty for their employment in mobilization.

Progress is also being made in the integration of the old reservists. That was seen during this visit with Home Defense Brigade 53 in Muensingen, whose Motorized Infantry Battalion 551 has just mastered its second mobilization exercise in the training area with the entire troop. The equipment unit has 14 active soldiers as its basic personnel--besides 12 first and staff sergeants, it has 2 officers, the commander and the heavy company commander. In a state of defense, the personnel strength is about 700 soldiers.

In his mobilization function, Lt Col Juergen Bauer, head of Training Center 55/4, is commander of Motorized Infantry Battalion 551. He can rely on reservists who are especially motivated, for many of them spent their military

service time in Motorized Infantry Battalion 552, the active sponsoring formation of the 551st. "To have their familiar comrade from their active time in a mobilization exercise next to them motivates reservists extraordinarily and increases their willingness to perform," says Bauer. "In addition, many reservists see Motorized Infantry Battalion 551 as their military home, because they can maintain contact with their old Battalion 552."

That is how it was this time too in Muensingen. The largest part of the reservists came from the Stuttgart area. Among them were comrades who were discharged from active military service just 10 months ago but there were also those who have been "abstinent" for some time, one for 17 years, for example. The commander had taken the trouble to break down the occupational groups. Accordingly, 50 percent of those training with him were skilled tradesmen and workers, about 20 percent were from sales occupations, about 10 percent were students and the rest were employed in the civil service. They train under the operational conditions of an active major formation. Juergen Bauer: "This also awakens the personal ambition of the old soldiers--here, for example, where the battalion has to dig in for two and a half days--to show the young soldiers once again what kind of military knowledge and skills, paired with cleverness and wisdom, they still have."

There those undergoing reserve training are trained as sharpshooters and on that very day attain an above-average hit rate. The soldiers on the Milan do not allow themselves even a single miss. As early as the second day of training, the "motley" mortar forces are not inferior to their active comrades when it comes to the speed of occupying a firing position and establishing combat readiness.

But all this was not a "show" for the deputy army chief of staff, responsible for the territorial army, with his escorts and a group of journalists. The visitors could merely observe the combat training in progress. It was therefore neither interrupted nor were soldiers called out from time to time to answer questions from General Malecha. In a regular break, he later had the opportunity to do so. And the soldiers in training hardly took the time during the training for a few words when the journalists managed to reach their emplacement or "surrounded" a Milan operator.

Only a few of them had difficulties in being released by their civilian employer for the military training. Most of them, however, came from medium-sized and larger firms. It is generally a real problem for the enterprises with two or three employees. To be sure, the high-ranking military people do indeed understand when these very small companies request that their employees be exempted as indispensable. But Lieutenant General Malecha presents figures that show that the burden on the firms with reserve trainees is slight: an employee misses more than 11 percent of the annual working time because of leave, 5 percent of which is sick leave. But only 5 percent of the missed time is attributable to mobilization training.

Improper manning is still another problem that effects the military training itself and that continually gnaws at the motivation of the reservists. They are not isolated cases when, for example, a private of the reserve, who in

civilian 11. has long been a master automotive mechanic, performs his reserve training in the office of a battalion, whereas the programmer of a computer firm has to hold a wrench in the repair squad.

"Here we are hindered by data privacy," says General Malecha. He would be happy if soldiers of the reserve would themselves report their advancement in their civilian careers to the responsible Bundeswehr organizations. It would then be a great deal easier to plan their activities as reserve trainees appropriately.

Precisely in the territorial army as well, it is extraordinarily important to be able to put the right man in the right spot. For in the future, higher and higher demands will have to be placed on the "fourth military service." And the importance that is being attached to the territorial army can be seen in the fact that in 1988 the large fall army exercise will not be carried out by one of the three corps but by the Southern Territorial Command.

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## HEAVIER PENALTIES FOR RESERVISTS SHIRKING REFRESHER TRAINING

Bonn LOYAL in German Jan 87 p 23

[Article by Manfred Werle: "Was It Worth While?"]

[Text] There was a large crowd in front of the largest hall of the municipal court in Cologne. A not-exactly everyday gathering of people interested in the case sought admission. The smallest group was formed by those who can probably be found there every day--housewives, pensioners and unemployed. A larger contingent was made up of active soldiers of the post and reservists from Cologne.

Most, however, were as young as they were uniform: in gym shoes and with a sodern shaggy look, about 150 supporters wanted to follow the trial against the total objector K. from Cologne and obviously thereby impress the court through their mass presence. But it did not come to this, because the judge and public prosecutor already have experience with magnitudes in the spectators' area that are otherwise known only in sensational trials. Occasional boos and murmurings of disapproval during the pleadings remained without effect.

Otherwise, it can be supposed that at times at least the arguments of the accused and his attorney seemed fantastic to many like-minded persons. K. was initially a recognized conscientious objector, had performed his civilian duty--completely according to the rules--as a youth supervisor in a Catholic parish, and formally "resigned" a month before finishing his duty. His arguments--before the court as well--were voluminous and presented extremely eloquently but ultimately were not conclusive. That is, he went so far as to assert that charitable facilities are also intended for military purposes. In any case, despite the well-meaning warnings from the judge, he insisted on total objection, in the clear knowledge that he would be convicted for this reason. His prison sentence was suspended and he was put on probation.

The sympathizers left undecided, in part with sleeping bags under their arms. Was the sentence positive? Presumably only for the moment. The observer was thus left with the question of whether the accused is to be seen as a kind of martyr or as a person acting out of conviction. District Judge Becker had less trouble 2 hours earlier with Martin P. from Frechen. The 25-year-old retail salesman, now a sales representative, was supposed to train with a home

defense company. After receiving his draft notice, he reported to the district selective service board that occupational reasons prevented him from appearing. The board then offered him a deferment. P. rejected this alternative, however, and applied for recognition as a conscientious objector. His application was denied.

The charge was then desertion. The public prosecutor asked for 3 months without probation. P. was obviously stunned, because with such a judgement he had to expect dismissal by his firm without fail, as he said. Once again, the judge gave him probation plus a fine of 500 marks in the hope that P., despite his conscience and job, would appear for the next call-up. It was probably clear to the many listeners and to the court that the accused basically wants to get out of service, for his arguments for objection were all too flimsy.

One look at Juergen K. and one thought immediately of a hard nut to crack. With long hair, somewhat unkempt, stocky, no occupation and unemployed, and living with unemployment assistance, he has long been familiar to the court. In March, he was supposed to report for 8 days of training. And since he, in his own words, had been drinking a lot at the time and was out on the street with no permanent residence (he did, nevertheless, receive the induction notice), he was "simply ashamed to report" on account of his poor state. In the meantime, he is now somewhat better and therefore he "of course will come the next time." In view of probable prosecution in the event of the recurrence of various offenses against property, the judge dismissed these proceedings.

In the case of 25-year-old Wolfgang L., it was the new job that he supposedly would have endangered if he had followed the induction notice. He ignored it, likewise a telegraphic order, because he had found a job as a painter in the Belgian military hospital (Judge Becker: "They would certainly have understood."). L. also showed good intentions for the future and received a month with probation and a fine of 300 marks, payable to UNICEF.

Klaus-Leo Sch., store clerk from Cologne, single with a net monthly wage of DM1,950, also got 6 weeks on probation and a fine of DM500. Without asking for a deferment for occupational reasons, he simply did not show up for induction in an air force squadron in the Eifel post of Mechernich. He had, however, asked his firm to go to the trouble for him. It refused, even threatening Sch. with disadvantages for his career in the firm if he were to miss an advanced training course because of the reserve training. Truly remarkable behavior by the firm management, which an ordinary person such as Sch. could interpret as follows (although the judge did not ask him about this): when my employers, who should know better than I, are so careless about their civic duties, why should I make a special effort?



Here, based on all the cases of desertion, it is apparent that many young people are not conscious of the consequences of their actions. They slide recklessly and needlessly into a situation that they initially do not fully comprehend. They decide for a moment incorrectly, in the assumption that they have handled their current situation in the best manner. The rude awakening comes at the latest when they are summoned to court. If someone is sentenced in the name of the people, even if it is on probation, then he can calmly consider whether his shirking was worth while.

For he now has a criminal record.

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PERSONNEL CHIEF REVIEWS PROBLEMS OF RESERVIST CONCEPT '90

Bonn TRUPPENPRAXIS in German May 87 pp 218-221

[Interview with Brig Gen Werner von Scheven, date and place not given: "Reservist Concept for the 1990's"; first paragraph is TRUPPENPRAXIS introduction]

Text] The still-valid mission of the Bundeswehr of guaranteeing the national defense continues to require a high present personnel strength. Beyond that, for a national defense emergency, the Bundeswehr must see to it that an adequate number of trained and combat-ready reservists earmarked for mobilization assignments are available. In view of the age groups with few births that in the 1990's will affect not only the Bundeswehr but also the entire national economy, it is a difficult task to resolve. Therefore, under the leadership of Lt Gen Heinz Kasch, former deputy chief of staff of the army, the Bundeswehr leadership has worked out a Reservist Concept '90. TRUPPENPRAXIS questioned Brig Gen Werner von Scheven, head of Staff Section I--Internal Command, Personnel and Training in the command staff of the armed forces, on problems and consequences of this planning.

[Question] The subject of "reservists" has preoccupied the Bundeswehr since the end of the activation phase. What is new about the concept now under discussion?

[Answer] It is true that the Bundeswehr was always comprised of active soldiers and reservists. The Bundeswehr has a peacetime strength and a wartime strength that is substantially greater. With its peacetime strength, the Bundeswehr is supposed to guarantee that the enemy could not count on any success from a surprise use of his military power. This peacetime strength has been and continues to be 495,000 operationally ready soldiers. Of these in the 1990's, 24,000 will be reservists in standby readiness and 15,000 reservists at reserve training sites.

[Question] That is, in view of the unchanged situation with respect to security, it will be necessary to adhere to the named present personnel strength?

[Answer] The question of whether one can get along with a smaller peacetime strength must be measured primarily against the options that the Warsaw Pact

would have with the existing forces in a military conflict. According to all that we know, the option of a conventional war limited to Europe is accruing to the Warsaw Pact.

In the last 10 years, the Warsaw Pact has undertaken a substantial strengthening of its conventional armament. Hence, it is not possible to reduce the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr. We must assume that we will not have longer early-warning times than heretofore.

The defensive strength of the Bundeswehr--including reservists--has the purpose of giving the defense the necessary staying power, so that in the event of a military conflict the strategy of deterrence can be continued with the objective of ending the war without being forced by military necessity to react early with nuclear weapons.

In the past the priority was exclusively with the peacetime strength of the armed forces. What is new about the current situation is that the conventional defensive capability in wartime strength must be increased. In order to be able to cope with the new development, the active soldiers must also see themselves as future reservists. As early as the training of active soldiers, we must keep in mind that they will later be reservists.

[Question] Would this not mean a complete change in the training structures?

[Answer] It means a reform of the entire training system of the armed forces. In general, I would call the new reservist concept one of the most important reform projects since the establishment of the Bundeswehr.

The training system may reach the limits of what can be done. In the structure of the armed forces and in their organization, therefore, the preconditions must be established for the availability of a reserve strength meeting the demand.

I would like to demonstrate this with a few figures. Theoretically we now have three times the number of reservists needed by the Bundeswehr. The reservist "requirement" is around 850,000; we have about 2.4 million available. For this reason, we can currently afford to train active soldiers who will later not be needed as reservists at all.

The situation is changing however, because the number of reservists is becoming smaller. It will decline to about 1.8 million. At the same time, however, the strengthening of the conventional defensive capability will mean an increase of about 50 percent in the requirement for reservists as compared with today. In 1995, it will be about 1.27 million.

For this reason, we will no longer be able to afford to train active soldiers who are no longer used with their skills.

That leads to the statement: the entire training system of the armed forces--and that will not be enough--the internal structure of the armed forces will have to orient itself toward the defense personnel requirement of the Bundeswehr. This, in turn, presupposes that there must be a change in the

consciousness and self-understanding of the active soldiers. It will not be possible to resolve the task without this change of consciousness.

[Question] Does not the problem of the introduction of new weapon systems also play a role here? A substantial part of the active soldiers has presumably been trained in weapon systems that they later will not see at all as reservists. They would then have to be retrained.

[Answer] There has always been the task of keeping the reservist set aside for mobilization assignments at the latest level of training. The reserve training areas serve this purpose. A reserve training area is a kind of manpower slot that can be passed on from reservist to reservist over the course of the year. With a reserve training area, one can induct about 30 reservists annually for reserve training. With the substantially greater requirement for reservists, however, we will have to increase the number of reserve training areas.

[Question] Hence, reservists must be trained or further trained by soldiers who were trained accordingly in this special function. Does this not mean an additional load for the active troop when it must provide training forces?

[Answer] That is right. And because it is so, we must strive to see that the reservist is prepared through his service as an active soldier for his later function as a reservist. We must see to it that he can apply the skills that he gains as an active soldier later in his capacity as a reservist in the mobilization order.

That is largely not the case at the moment. I would like to illustrate the reasons for this. We can divide the Bundeswehr personnel requirement for the state of defense into four large groups. We have the personnel requirement in the area of the combat and operational systems; we have the combat support area; we have the personnel requirement in the area of supply and medical services; and finally we have a personnel requirement in the area of motorized infantry and security forces.

The active troop builds a stock of reservists through the ongoing discharge of draftees, long-term and career servicemen.

The Bundeswehr must show a high present strength so as to be able to ward off a surprise attack successfully through containment operations. Hence, the Bundeswehr is to be manned in its peacetime structures in such a way that the bulk of the personnel of the combat and operational forces is present in peacetime. They have a relatively small requirement for reservists. That also means that they "produce" a surplus of reservists.

On the other hand, in the case of the motorized infantry, logistic and security forces in peacetime, for example, one needs fewer present soldiers, for they are not yet needed, or not in the planned numbers, for the containment of a surprise attack. These formations have a high proportion of staff and therefore they "produce" fewer reservists. A shortage of suitable reservists is programed in advance here.

The situation is variable for the combat support and command forces. Almost the entire communications force is present even in peacetime. The artillery is also largely present in peacetime. On the other hand, the military police are largely staff in peacetime.

In one area, then, a surplus of reservists is "produced" and there is a shortage in another. And very many reservists are discharged, who are not used at all with their qualifications. In the medical service as well, only a small part is present in peacetime. In the state of defense, however, there is a very high personnel requirement here.

All in all, the necessary balance between the excessive supply of reservists and a shortage is a substantial load on the training system of the armed forces. It is a load for the active personnel of the Bundeswehr in their responsibility for training. And that must also be seen with the background of the already high load on service time. We have the requirement and intention of reducing this load on service time. Thus, we must achieve a situation in which the peacetime structure of the Bundeswehr is adapted to the defense requirement in such a way that the loads on the training system and instructors remain supportable. These considerations are currently being raised in the military services--army, air force and navy. We will take a look at the results in about a year. Now I can talk only about the problems.

[Question] In this connection, what tasks accrue to the formation of reservists?

[Answer] The formation of reservists with the more than 100,000 members that it now has has established for itself the task of taking care of the reservists interested in voluntary collaboration. There is a contractual agreement between the formation and the federal minister for defense. The formation has taken over the tasks in the area of the reservists' work that cannot be resolved by the armed forces. The formation of reservists is also the switching point to all other formations that do the work of reservists.

The work of reservists is comprised of two tasks: the first is defense policy work. We are interested in having our reservists be capable of making statements and contributing to the discussion in questions having to do with the Bundeswehr and the defense of this country.

The second is the military development, oriented to the needs of the armed forces, of the soldiers in the general qualifications as soldiers, that is, from map reading to shooting and from sports to war games for officers.

Overall the reservists formation does good service and in the future it will have to increase its efforts to meet the new challenges.

[Question] What is the situation with the link to the units in which the reservists not only train but also are supposed to fight, if necessary?

[Answer] You are talking about the integration of the reservists in their units. That is a requirement that results from the recognition that a unit is hardly up to the stresses in battlefield operations if the members of this



unit do not know each other and do not see themselves as good comrades able to get along with one another. One can establish these preconditions only when the units take part in reserve training fully assembled. But naturally also by seeing to it that the reservists are taken care of between reserve training sessions by the commanders of their units and battalions.

Here we have several difficulties: the first difficulty is that at the moment about 30 percent of the reservists are freed from duty during reserve training and replaced by other reservists who are assigned elsewhere or for other than mobilization work. That means that in terms of numbers we always attain the strength that we need for our reserve training but a part of the soldiers does not belong to this unit but is personnel coming primarily from field or personnel replacements. So it is difficult to integrate the reservists into their units.

The second problem is that at the moment the unit leaders and commanders cannot get any official support when they make an effort to maintain contact with their reservists between reserve training sessions, perhaps through letters or by telephone. We have not now established all the preconditions so that the commander of a staffed formation can adequately influence the composition of his formation. We want to change this. We want to do more than heretofore to get commanders and company commanders involved among the reservists. We also want to put them in a position to be able to concern themselves with the care of their reservists between reserve training sessions without thereby having to make an excessive private effort. And we want to reach a point where paid leave for reserve training is reduced to the absolutely unavoidable level.

[Question] One of the most important problems seems to me to be in the public discussion over the new reservist concept, the understanding for more reserve training both by inductees themselves as well as by their employers.

[Answer] That is right. The Bundeswehr with its personnel requirement sees itself in competition with others, who likewise have a need for personnel, a need that in the future will have to be covered out of the increasingly scarce supply of manpower. That includes the economy and the civil service. It is true for short-service volunteers that are needed by the Bundeswehr and it is also true for the reservists. Paid leave of reservists for reserve training certainly means a sacrifice for many master craftsmen and small enterprises. Large enterprises can more easily handle that and can plan for it better.

We are talking with the economic groups. We are presented with such wishes as, for example, the wish that reserve training be announced farther in advance. We will make this possible. We will attempt to announce the intended call-up for reserve training as early as a year in advance.

An additional wish is that we consider certain branches that cannot get along without their personnel during the time of their respective seasonal peaks. But here the Bundeswehr has reached the limits of what it can do. For we cannot arrange things, even for reasons of equity in conscription, so that entire units or formations are made up of waiters or travel agents. Here it will be necessary to reach agreement in individual cases.

[Question] But there is still the problem of use near the place of residence.

[Answer] That is right. Use near the place of residence is especially important, because in the case of the reservists, for example, who are used for a rapid increase in the presence of the Bundeswehr or in the protection of facilities and installations--and that is more than 100,000 reservists--we are working towards planning their use as near as possible to their homes. We will not be able to apply this to every reservist, also for reasons of equity in conscription. We will have to accept the fact that reservists will have to be programed over long distances. This results, among other things, from the fact that most of the conscripts and reservists are from the western part of the FRG, whereas most of the troops are stationed in the eastern half of the FRG.

[Question] Apropos equity in conscription: does the striving for equity also apply for reservists?

[Answer] Of course! We are working under the requirement of establishing more military equity even in exhausting the reservist potential, as it has heretofore been called. We are making an effort to do so but we also know that the problem of equity as it now exists will largely take care of itself by the time when the demand will hardly be less than the entire stock of reservists, that is, in the mid-1990's. When we need almost every reservist, there there will be only slight differences between the army, air force and navy, between the rank and file, officers or noncommissioned officers, and between reservists with different qualifications or with different very distant places of residence.

There is one thing, however, that we will not be able to achieve: an even call-up for reserve training, both with respect to the time intervals as well as in regard to the duration in each case. This is impossible, because there will be more and more units that will have to have reserve training annually, whereas there are other units that need their reservists for reserve training less frequently.

But we can arrange matters differently by exempting reservists programed for units with frequent training from the mobilization order sooner than others who are needed for reserve training at longer time intervals.

All in all, we will in the meantime seek structures that produce more equity in conscription. But we know that such problems will be behind us in 8 years at the latest, because then we will need almost every reservist.

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## AIR FORCE TESTS NEW RADAR, COMMUNICATIONS GEAR IN EXERCISE

36170135a Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Aug 87 p 8

[Article: "Big Air Force Exercise Off to Weak Start; Conventional Aerial Reconnaissance Combined with New Radar and Communications Equipment in Savo"]

[Test] Kuopio (HS)--The roar of the Air Force's olive drab fighters and shiny-flanked trainers should have been heard frequently in the skies of Central Finland these past few days. Launched on Friday, the biggest Air Force military exercise of the past few years nevertheless got off to an extremely weak and "peaceful" start.

On Monday it was even quieter than on ordinary workdays at the Karjala Flight base in Rissala, the other central location for the exercise. Stern-faced sentries with their assault rifles leveled at the visitors and several Mig-21-bis guard-duty planes parked at the edge of the runway demanded passes of those who were reporting on the exercise.

It was also just as quiet in the control tower at Haapamaki near Maaninka, at the aerial reconnaissance station manned by tassel-necked reservists. The sounds of only a couple of aircraft were recorded during the day in the tower. Otherwise, the men's time was spent in admiring the countryside and heating up their tents.

Ordered to participate in exercises in the vicinity of Kuopio, the reservists nevertheless assured us of their vigilance, smiling out of the sides of their mouths: "Not even Mathias Rust could fly past us without our spotting him!"

The Air Force promises that the pace of the exercise will be considerably stepped up during the next few days.

To last a week, the Air Force's chief military exercise is the biggest exercise in 4 years involving Armed Forces flight equipment, the crews who maintain them and aerial reconnaissance. Over 2,000 reservists, most of them permanent cadre, and nearly all of the Air Force's Mig-21-bis and Draken fighters as well as its Hawk trainers are participating in it. Antiaircraft units are also participating in it.

The exercise site is the entire area in the country between the central and eastern parts of Pori-Utti and Ylivieska-Kajaani. Air Force commander Maj Gen Pertti Jokinen is commanding the exercise.

#### Complaints About Noise Already Registered

While big exercise air activities have not yet gotten into anywhere near full swing, exercise commanders have already received numerous complaints from civilians about flight noise. Most of the people have been alarmed by aircraft flying practically at ground level. Low-level flying has been going on in Eastern Finland all summer long now.

"Low-level flights are an essential part of such exercises and we hope that citizens will react to the loud noise produced by fighters with understanding. Even those who complain generally understand what is at issue in the end. We try to raise flight altitude when flying over population centers," Karjala Flight chief of staff Lt Col Carl-Gustav Karling assured us at an Air Force press conference.

The big Air Force exercise has also brought with it special provisions for other air traffic in the central and eastern parts of the country. Until next Friday flight commands are requiring small planes to maintain proper radio contact and civilian pilots to present more accurate flight plans than they ordinarily do.

Aside from new monitoring systems that make use of radar and computers, the Air Force still relies on watch towers and reservists' eyes and ears in keeping watch over our air space. During these few days the Army is trying to test the compatibilization of old-fashioned sensory surveillance and the new communications technology through this big exercise.

In the 1980's the Air Force has acquired new radar and communications equipment worth as much as several hundred million markkas. The bulk of this new technology has been procured from our domestic electronics industry. In addition to the radar and communications systems, flight combat guidance systems have also been thoroughly reworked.

On Monday Lt Col Kalevi Kepsu, the head of the Air Force communications school located in Tikkakoski, said that the big exercise now in progress is the first big fire test for the new Air Force ground equipment, like low-level monitoring radar, and for the men who operate it.

"We tested the radar and microprocessors as well as new communications equipment based on data transmission last year in Lapland. This time we are testing the equipment in an even broader context. We have reached a point at which Air Force data technology devices communicate with and transmit data to one another and our personnel merely oversee the operation," Kepsu remarked.

According to Kepsu, more demanding than before, this data technology will in the next few years cause the operation of and monitoring by means of radar and communications equipment to be shifted more than it has before from recruits to specialized salaried personnel in the Air Force too.



## DEFENSE MINISTER: FIGHTER ACQUISITION DECISION BY 1990

36170135b Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Aug 87 p 11

[Text] Rissala (HS)--Within 3 years at the latest the national government must decide on the procurement of fighter aircraft for the Air Force to be operational in the 1990's.

This was the opinion of Defense Minister Ole Norrback (Swedish People's Party) at Kuopio Airport on Tuesday evening. Norrback had come to observe the big Air Force exercise that is to last throughout this week at Rissala.

In Norrback's opinion, at least partial renewal of the present Air Force fighter equipment, procured largely in the 1970's, is a matter for the nation's political leaders [to decide on] in the very next few years. Having observed the Mig-21-bis take off on a combat flight, the minister categorically refused to venture to say where Finland would procure the new aircraft. It is estimated that the procurement of these aircraft will cost hundreds of millions of markkas.

Air Force commander Maj Gen Pertti Jokinen, who watched the exercise alongside the minister, said that the Air Force was particularly satisfied with the "procurement ratio" between Finland's neighbor countries with regard to the current fighter equipment. In Jokinen's opinion, there is no reason to change the center of gravity for procurements.

"Air Force Must Be Better Protected"

The Air Force has Swedish Drakens and Soviet Mig-21-bis for use as fighter aircraft. Last summer the Soviet Air Force presented the Mig-29 fighter, representing modern technology, at Rissala. At Rissala General Jokinen rejected premature speculation that this type of aircraft would be procured for Finland: "The alternatives for a possible aircraft are, however, few."

Minister Norrback also familiarized himself with the concrete emergency and take-off shelter for the Mig-21-bis alongside the runway at Rissala. In General Jokinen's opinion, the Finnish Air Force is still too visible at its air bases as things stand now:



"We are building more of these emergency shelters for both men and equipment. In the event of a war, the aircraft can in other respects be too easily destroyed on the ground," Jokinen remarked.

According to Jokinen, the Air Force will in the next few years also make an effort to provide smaller civilian airfields to be used as emergency bases with special emergency shelters. In Jokinen's opinion, after the wars the Air Force had kept the aircraft in nothing but "tarboard" in hangars and temporary shelters for too long.

Defense Minister Norrback looked into recruits' traffic safety record and the effectiveness of their training at Rissala. In his opinion, really effective measures are needed to reduce the number of crackups caused by conscripts. Also, more attention than at present must be devoted to a general improvement in the level of training in connection with the training of the men.

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CSO: 3617/135

## ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WARNS AGAINST WEAKENING DRAFT LAW

## 'Situational' Exemption Plan Condemned

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by Borge Brende: "Bull-Hansen Warns: 'Draft Law in Danger!'" ]

[Text] "In the worst case, it may be impossible to maintain armed forces of the magnitude required for deterring a potential attacker."

"The issue is whether we will continue to have armed forces based on conscription--a people's defense--in this country."

"In my opinion, there is nothing in our country's situation which suggests that the time is ripe to experiment with anything as fundamental as the basic military obligation."

"Will our allies risk placing their young men at our side if we do not feel that we personally are obligated?"

Armed Forces Chief Fredrik Bull-Hansen tells AFTENPOSTEN that he is afraid of the consequences for Norway's armed forces if attempts are made at creating new situational exemptions from military service.

## Clear Distinction

"I would assert that the distinction between a refusal based on pacifistic grounds, and a refusal based on situational conjecture, is fundamental. It may be very difficult to find flexible transitions which will meet the tastes of all interest and pressure groups. In my opinion, there is nothing in our country's situation which suggests that the time is ripe to experiment with anything as fundamental as the basic military obligation," states General Bull-Hansen.

## Liberal Practice

Bull-Hansen points out that, within the Western democracies, there is a basic human right afforded those who have a fundamental conviction against bearing arms against others under all situations, to be excused from doing so. Our system of laws guarantees this human right, and the law is implemented very liberally. "If the possibility for situational military exemptions is to be created, we must expect that military duty will become politicized. Among other things, there will be great difficulties inherent in the language of the law, as well as for our legal system in deciding which political points of view should, and should not, be accepted as a basis for exemption. And how is our legal system to interpret and implement conflicts connected with exemptions?", the armed forces chief asks.

"I am afraid that allowing for situational exemptions, practically speaking, can imply a change from a draft obligation to a situation where each individual, based on his own personal views, will decide whether the draft obligation obligates him. Dependent upon attitudes and trends, we can risk having critical swings, at any given time, in the numbers of those who will choose to perform service. In the worst situation, it might be impossible to maintain armed forces of the magnitude required for deterring a potential attacker," emphasized Bull-Hansen, who adds:

"It is no less serious that these shifts in numbers can influence military mobilization. At any given time--indeed even in a crisis situation for the country--soldiers and officers may decide that they will not bear arms after all."

## Allies

The armed forces chief believes that these important questions also have a moral side. "Among other things, it can be asked whether our allies will risk putting their own young men at our sides--and do we have the moral courage to ask them to do so--if we ourselves do not feel that we are obligated?"

Paper: Conscription Obligation Imperiled

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 July 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Draft Law in Danger"]

[Text] Will our allies risk putting their own young men at our sides if we ourselves do not feel obligated to defend our country? The question from armed forces chief, General Frederik Bull-Hansen, is justified. If the possibility of situational politically-based military exemptions is created, it will undermine both our conscription-based armed forces and our credibility among our alliance partners.

Center Party leader Johan J. Jakobsen was correct in asking the government to reconsider. Situational exemptions can make it impossible to maintain armed forces of the magnitude and strength necessary to deter a potential attacker. The demands now being put forth by the left wing are a threat to the armed forces' peacekeeping abilities.

Our country finds itself in an evermore exposed position on NATO's northern flank. We cannot afford to experiment with the basic conscription law, or with our armed forces and our credibility. The proposed expansion of the grounds for exemption from military service also will represent a lack of solidarity with those who do not neglect their military duty.

Given the current composition of Parliament, it is quite possible that the government will be able to put together a narrow majority in favor of creating politically-based exemptions from military service. A couple of defectors from the Center Party, or possibly from the Christian Democratic Party, can be enough in a given situation. However, we would hope that a government which recently promised to seek broad consensus concerning foreign and national security policies, is aware of its own responsibilities.

Warnings are coming from all quarters--from top military leaders, from tone-setting civilian leaders and from leading Labor Party politicians. The Labor Party's former defense minister Alv Jakob Fostervoll is not exaggerating when he says that the proposal will "weaken our defense to a degree and in a manner which will not serve our democracy."

In light of the continued Soviet arming in the north, the seriousness of the situation ought to be clear to each and all. The detailed report which now is being considered by the government only can lead to the conclusion that we must continue to have a draft law--a people's military--in this country. Thus, the proposal for allowing political exemptions from military service must be rejected as the attack which it is on our defensive capability. There is no room for compromise of any kind in this area.

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## PRIME MINISTER, DEFENSE MINISTER COMMENT ON ASW EFFORT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Aug 87 p 6

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Prime Minister Says Navy Improving"]

[Text] Musko Naval Base--Sweden's security policy has not failed even if intrusions into Swedish territory are continuing despite the fact that the defense system has been given more resources for submarine defense. The Navy has improved and become more effective.

That is what Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson said on Monday when he and Defense Minister Roine Carlsson spent a day with the Navy to study the organization of antisubmarine efforts.

Foreign submarines and other underwater activity have plagued the Swedish Armed Forces since 1980 and despite the use of weapons and extensive sub-hunting efforts the Navy has not yet succeeded in forcing a foreign submarine to the surface and expelling it.

## Improving

In spite of repeated questions the prime minister would not agree that a failure of security policy is involved.

"We are improving. No country has succeeded in forcing a submarine to the surface in the postwar period despite the efforts that have been made. Sweden has 8 million inhabitants and has to guard a coastline as long as the eastern seaboard of the United States from Canada down to the southern tip of Florida. This is an incredibly large area and an extremely big job and surveillance involves a very complicated technology," said Ingvar Carlsson.

He told us that the Navy's submarine defense is now being reinforced but he did not disclose any details. The fact that it is now easier for the Navy to detect incursion attempts is a sign that we have increased our effectiveness in comparison with other countries.



## Confidence

Against the background of the alleged activities of foreign underwater vessels in Tore and elsewhere, we asked the prime minister if he had confidence in the assessments of the Commander in Chief [OB] and other military men when it comes to the submarine threat to Sweden.

"Yes, I have already said this summer that the military is handling this as well as possible. We receive reports of what occurred and we make our evaluations on that basis. In principle I am very confident that we have competent professionals who are dealing with this in the best possible way," said Ingvar Carlsson.

Up on the bridge of the coastal fleet's latest modern mine-detecting vessel, Koster, the prime minister and the defense minister exchanged a few words with one of the recruits who take an active part in submarine defense. The recruit is fireman Christer Brandstrom, who has the unenviable job of going down and occasionally inactivating remote bottom mines. The mine-detecting Koster, one of the Navy's new Landsort series of three ships, has unique mine-detecting equipment, including a high-frequency hydrophone that is also used to locate foreign submarines that are concealed on the bottom.

## Still Behind Demand

Several high-ranking military men came along on the prime minister's instructional visit, including OB Bengt Gustafsson, the chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral Bengt Schuback, and the chief of the coastal fleet, Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg.

On several occasions prior to the passage of the Defense Act in June the chief of the Navy underlined his desire for an immediate decision concerning a second antisubmarine force. This did not materialize; the Defense Act provides 400 million kronor for submarine defense over the next 5 years. The first sub-hunting force will be ready in 1990.

"I still stand firmly behind the demand for another antisubmarine force to enable the Navy to do its job effectively and put a stop to the violations," Vice Adm Bengt Schuback told DAGENS NYHETER.

## Must Wait

But the Navy chief will probably have to wait for more funds. The prime minister will not work for more money in addition to the funds provided by the Defense Act, in spite of continued violations and a reduced budget deficit.

"There must be some kind of order in policy and a parliamentary decision was reached after extensive analysis by the Defense Committee and evaluations by the various parties," the prime minister said.

He fears that the Navy will receive 2 billion kronor in the 1980's on top of the 400 million. Thus consideration must be given to what should be expanded in the defense system. There are other important areas in the Navy and in the Armed Forces in general.

"I hope we arrive at a good balance," said Ingvar Carlsson.

The OB's report on the Tore incident, which will be released in a few weeks after all the indications, technical and visual as well as signal reconnaissance data, etc., have been analyzed in detail, will be relevant in the context of submarine defense.

#### Debate in Fall

Later this fall the Commander in Chief will initiate a debate on military objectives; what the defense system should be used for and what various possible war scenarios involving Sweden might look like.

Defense Minister Roine Carlsson, who on this occasion scrupulously avoided calling attention to himself on the Koster's overcrowded bridge, welcomes a debate on the objectives of the Swedish defense system.

"It is always important for the military to be involved in the debate and we listen carefully to what is said. This affects people very much," said Roine Carlsson.

#### Broadly Based

The need for a new Swedish defense doctrine in connection with the OB's debate on objectives is being discussed in military circles. Various questions, such as whether the entire country should be defended in a war, could then be raised. The defense minister is skeptical about the need for a new Swedish defense doctrine. The present doctrine is based on the idea that the entire nation should be defended.

"No, a new defense doctrine is not needed. The present one represents an outlook that has been around for a long time. It is broadly based and has broad political acceptance compared to the situation in other countries," Roine Carlsson told DAGENS NYHETER.

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CSO: 3650/191

## WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION IN HOME GUARD OVER OBSOLETE ARMS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Aug 87 p 7

[Article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] A dissatisfied rattling of arms can be heard from Sweden's 140,000 Home Guard members. The dissatisfaction stems from the fact that the Commander in Chief [OB] and the defense establishment have assigned difficult military tasks to the Home Guard without providing the force with a commensurate amount of good equipment.

Automatic weapons, protective vests, modern radio equipment, bloodhounds, hard armor-piercing projectiles, snow outfits, etc. are lacking.

Angry Home Guard personnel say they don't have a chance of survival against a well-armed sabotage unit if their only weapon is a 19th century rifle that will soon be 100 years old. According to many critics the 1987 Defense Act has throttled the Home Guard because of the Army's difficult economic situation.

Major General Robert Lugn, chief of the National Home Guard, told DAGENS NYHETER that now is the time for the Home Guard to intensify its demands.

"We must be more militant. The volunteer members of the Home Guard who are prepared to defend Sweden with their lives must be given a reasonable chance of survival in a war," Robert Lugn said.

#### Critical Voices

Critical voices within the Home Guard have cited the old Mauser rifle dating from 1896 as proof that the equipment has not kept up with the times. The '96 army rifle, whose hard recoil has been a trial to the shoulders of many recruits, lives on in Home Guard units and will probably celebrate its 100th birthday before it is retired. This may well be a world record.

At the same time as Home Guard members are being asked to stand guard with their 19th century rifles, modern commando and rifle units are being equipped with light automatic rifles with a high bullet velocity and great accuracy, effective at both long and short range. The army rifle does all right in

long-range situations, but performs poorly in close combat. It has five cartridges in the magazine and one in the barrel. Impossible to fire rapidly. The Army's AK-4 automatic rifle has 20 shells in the magazine.

The chief of the Army is responsible for supplying Home Guard units with the equipment they need. For the time being preparedness aspects and local priorities will determine whether the Home Guard gets such things as AK-4 automatic rifles ahead of other units.

#### Demand

A demand that was made before the passage of the Defense Act called for all regular Home Guard personnel and members of Industrial Defense units to be supplied with automatic weapons by 1993. This demand was not met. This year's Defense Act delays the replacement by 10-15 years.

Defense Minister Roine Carlsson, a member of the Home Guard in Hallstavik in the 1950's, is often asked when the old army rifle will be replaced.

"It will be replaced as production of the AK-5 makes it possible to release the AK-4. I am just as anxious as all Home Guard people to have this happen as quickly as possible," the defense minister said in an interview in the Home Guard publication HEMVARNET.

The new automatic rifle, the AK-5, with a caliber of 5.56 mm, is now being manufactured in Sweden. The first units trained in using the new light automatic weapon with great firepower and a high degree of accuracy are the Navy's commandos, air field infantry units and the Lapland light infantry at I-22 in Kiruna.

The old M-96 rifle has also created a psychological problem for the Home Guard.

New younger Home Guard men feel they are being downgraded from an automatic weapon to an ordinary rifle. They have had basic training in using an automatic rifle during their compulsory military service. Now that they are serving on a volunteer basis they are given poorer weapons.

The Home Guard would like to be taken more seriously when its combat tasks are becoming more difficult. "Home Guard boys" are often looked down on as potbellied individuals who sit in the sun and drink beer on some wooded hillside. Career military men often turn up their noses at the Home Guard.

"We deserve to be taken more seriously," said Jan Olov Wall, head of the Home Guard in Salem. He is 45 years old, a designer for Ericsson, and devotes between 200 and 300 hours of his spare time to the Home Guard.

#### Inferior Weapons

We asked him out at the Home Guard Combat School in Vallinge near Malaren to put together an ideal Home Guard equipment list. The weapons are used by some units, but others do not have them.

In addition to AK-4 automatic rifles the list includes clothing that can protect soldiers from such things as hand grenade fragments. The Army has come up with a protective vest made of kevlar fabric. No decision has yet been made concerning the number to be provided or how they will be distributed. Home Guard soldiers on guard duty could use body protection, which reduces injuries in a real war.

Along with the automatic rifle, the KSP-58 machine gun is a feared and highly effective support weapon. The Carl Gustaf antitank rifle is on the list as well as antitank grenade launchers. The Home Guard also wants hard armor-piercing ammunition for the AK-4. Light armored vehicles and helicopters are part of the threat picture. Light radio equipment, video amplifiers and searchlights are also requested. Nighttime combat plays an increasingly large role in modern warfare.

Local Home Guard members sometimes ask the staff of the National Home Guard why surplus Army materiel, such as knapsacks, winter clothing, tents, etc., is not turned over to the Home Guard instead of being sold.

"We turn down that kind of inferior equipment. There is a risk that we will have to keep it. The Home Guard should be provided with good equipment or none at all," said Major Olof Bergendahl of the National Home Guard Staff.

#### Home Guard Has 140,000 Volunteer Members

The 140,000 members of the Home Guard are part of the Army's war organization and are recruited for volunteer service. Swedish citizenship is required. There are many immigrants in Home Guard units. Conscripts under the age of 47 can be assigned to the Home Guard in wartime.

It is the duty of Home Guard members to carry out their assignments in the initial stage of a surprise attack against Sweden. They are to man fortifications on the coast, along the borders and at air bases, harbors and other important locations. They must be able to combat armored enemy forces brought in by airplane as well as sabotage units.

The Commander in Chief can place the Home Guard on alert without consulting the government.

The Home Guard has its roots in the people's forces of old. It was formed by an act of parliament in 1940. The military organization includes more than 100,000 men and women. Industrial Defense units, which are recruited at job sites to defend their own plants, include around 16,000 people.

There are about 170 Home Guard districts and 1,100 Home Guard areas. An area consists of 2-4 Home Guard platoons, approximately 75-200 Home Guard personnel. A Home Guard platoon is made up of 25-50 men who are divided into groups in charge of defense artillery, antitank rifles, machine guns, stretcher duty and carrying dispatches. They are led by a platoon leader who has an alternate. Some 24,000 men and women from various volunteer



organizations are included. In the event of mobilization around 50,000 conscripts assigned to Home Guard duty are added to the ranks.

It is something new for the Home Guard that 3,000 people have been designated for naval duty. Some 50 boat groups with their own boats have been formed.

After the OB and military leaders have ordered the Home Guard on alert, a Home Guard alarm can be sounded. This means that units must be ready for combat within 2 hours.

The Home Guard budget for this year is around 175 million kronor. A Home Guard soldier costs around 1,000 kronor a year. This sum includes training costs, ammunition, food, insurance premiums, etc.

The Home Guard Combat School in Vallinge outside Stockholm trains around 1,500 officers and instructors each year.

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CSO: 3650/191

## GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, LABOR DISCUSS AID TO STEEL INDUSTRY

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 20 Jun 87 p 3

[Text] A final decision on possible Bonn aids to finance social plans in the steel industry will not be taken before the meeting of the European Steel Council in late September. Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann indicated this quite clearly following the second steel round in the Bonn Chancellery.

By contrast both the steel employers and the Industrial Labor Union Metal are demanding that the Federal Government should officially approve their bilateral agreement within the next 10 days. This agreement specifies that the public authorities should provide non-repayable subsidies to the same extent as before 1985.

According to the report by IG [industrial labor union] Metal chairman Franz Steinkuehler and Heinz Kriwet, chairman of the Iron and Steel Industry Association, the parties consider that the per employee cost of workers' benefit plans amounts to DM75,000. Until 1985, the employers and Brussels had assumed two thirds of that amount. The Federal Government had contributed two thirds and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia one third of the remaining third. Neither Bonn nor Duesseldorf have yet stated their willingness in future also to honor the obligations assumed in the past.

If we accept the premise that benefit plans need to be created for 20,000 employees each of whom will be endowed with an average DM75,000, Bonn--if the old arrangement were to persist--would have to come up with the amount of DM333 million of the total cost of DM1.5 billion, the Laender involved with DM167 million.

The steel employers as well as the labor unions attempted to unequivocally tell the Chancellery that the agreement arrived at by the two parties would hold only if the public authorities actually assume the part assigned them. "The minimum consensus between the industry and IG Metal stands and falls with the Federal Government's willingness to grant the steel workers a secure future and the steel districts sound economic prospects," Steinkuehler commented.

According to this concept, the steel employers are willing to renounce layoffs on condition that the public authority continues to pay its share toward welfare plans. The steel employers also obligate themselves in all future investment decisions to make sure that, if at all possible, any future investments are directed to the affected steel districts. If no other jobs can be made available to redundant workers, dismissals are to be contractually so arranged as to be socially supportable.

Consequently the "deputy principle" is to be introduced and short-time work expanded. As the steel industry is virtually unable to produce employers for workers likely to be asked to take early retirement, the deputy principle is to be employed to the effect that younger steelworkers are transferred to other corporate departments. Consonant with the rules governing the iron and steel industry, older employees working in these departments are then to serve as deputies and be retired early.

#### Bluem Amenable to Support Structural Adjustments in the Steel Industry

Federal Labor Minister Norbert Bluem explained that the Federal Government intends to give long-term support to structural adjustments in the steel industry. Backdated to 1 January 1987, for example, the retaining pay by which the legally prescribed unemployment compensation is hiked to around 85 percent of the former net wage, will be extended from the 12 months currently in force to 32 months for all employees from age 54. Younger employees will get a graduated extension analogous to the period of unemployment pay.

The retraining subsidy will be roughly tripled to DM200 per month, and the top income for transition aid--designed to facilitate a socially secure transition to social security pensions for older steel employees--will be raised from DM2,500 to DM3,000 per month.

The length of the period in which short hour pay is awarded in the steel industry has also been extended to 36 months. The age graduated extension of the period of payment of unemployment compensation benefits the steel sector, too.

Bluem explained that existing and new provisions already made available more than DM300 million for the early retirement of 25,000 steelworkers. Last Tuesday he additionally offered to definitely implement the deputy principle at a cost of DM70 million and, analogous to the regulations for the severely handicapped, drop to 50 years the age limit for workers who had worked at least 15 years in the first and second heat. The Federal Labor Minister calculated the cost of this measure at DM90 million. However, Bluem stressed that these additionally offered DM170 million might also be used for other measures in case the steel employers and labor unions came up with sensible suggestions.

The participants in the steel negotiations agreed in the next 10 days at expert and ministerial level to precisely define the figures pertinent to the forthcoming measures. It was not clear after the second round of steel negotiations whether 20,000, 25,000 or even 35,000 steelworkers will be

affected by the forthcoming measures. When calculating the costs of benefit plans, employers and unions took their cue from the 1985 average per capita figure of DM75,000.

Nor is it obvious whether this figure needs to be corrected downward as the result of the extension of unemployment compensation or retaining pay. Bluem feels that benefit plans need to be negotiated in the enterprises while, when addressing their demands to Bonn, employers and (even less) IG Metal have not yet taken the expanded support payments into account.

Bangemann declared quite unequivocally that the Federal Government could not possibly come to a decision on this issue before end September, because this would be tantamount to abandoning its strategy for the Brussels Steel Council. Bluem, for his part, called on the steel employers not to decide on mass dismissals before that date. He said he was unable to imagine any socially satisfactory process that was accompanied by huge layoffs.

On behalf of the Federal Government, ministers Gerhard Stoltenberg, Wolfgang Schaeuble, Martin Bangemann and Norbert Bluem joined Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the negotiations. Seated on the other side of the table were the representatives of the Iron and Steel Industry Association, the IG Metal and the German Salaried Employees' Union.

The negotiators agreed that the Brussels negotiations on the extension of the European crisis measures should be based on a paper submitted by the Iron and Steel Industry Association. Heinz Kriwet, its chairman, said that this would mean the first ever total unanimity between the Federal Government, the industry association and the employee representatives.

#### Violations To Be Severely Punished

According to the paper submitted, at the Brussels negotiations Bonn will champion strict observance of the subsidy code of 27 November 1985 as well as the imposition of penalties for violations. Furthermore, a new and effective system of quotas is to be introduced. The German steel industry should be able to at least retain its traditional weight. The system should be designed to operate for at least 3 years.

The reduction of capacities is possible only by way of a quota system. The system of quota purchase, on which the Eurofer concept is based, needs to be further pursued. The necessary sociopolitical adjustments need to be made publicly and without discrimination. Dumped or subsidized imports from countries that are not signatories to the agreement must be prevented by thoroughgoing and more rapid procedures.

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CSO: 3620/259

## DIHT URGES BONN TO FINANCE TAX CUT BY REDUCING SUBSIDIES

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 16 Jun 87 p 1

[Text] The Federal Government should keep strictly to the tax compromise resolved upon--without any cuts whatever. This was the demand by Otto Wolff von Amerongen, president of the German Industrial and Trade Association (DIHT) pronounced yesterday, Monday, in an address to the Passau Chamber of Industry and Commerce.

Wolff objected to the Federal Government's current tax and financial policy, saying that "we are obviously at another turning point--this time in the wrong direction." The coalition, he claimed, was moving further and further away from its promise to finance tax reform by reducing tax preferences and subsidies.

Fearing the "thunderclaps from various corners," and under pressure of high spending risks, the government appeared to be taking the easier road to new and considerably larger debts. The DIHT president warned that this might be counterproductive, because rising interest rates could well and indeed rapidly cancel the economy's gain from tax relief.

Wolff also decisively rejected higher value added taxation. This also would result in the Federal Government's loss of credibility with both business and consumers. Wolff remarked that "the government is unlikely to earn much applause by juggling with tax relief on the one hand and some tax increases on the other."

#### Objections to Subsidies for the Airbus

The government needed the courage to reduce subsidies and maintain strict spending discipline. However, not much of that was noticeable--on the contrary, subsidies were rising faster than in the era of the Social-Liberal coalition.

The DIHT president was particularly critical of the new subsidies for the Airbus. In view of the high spending risks (Wolff here cited the requests submitted by agriculture, coal, the baby year, women who took part in the removal of ruins after World War II, Europe and the Federal Institute for Labor), it was not sound in fiscal terms to write blank checks for the Airbus



through 1996. The increase in the aid to shipyards also was a new step in the wrong direction. Wolff renewed his proposal as a first step to cut subsidies by 10 percent across the board.

#### Paying Attention to Justice and Simplification

Despite some defects, the planned tax reform is better than its reputation. This is the verdict of the IFO Institute for Economic Research in Munich just before its 38th annual general meeting that will deal with the topic "major tax reform" in Munich on 26 June. Comparing tax reforms in three countries--the United States, Japan and the FRG--, the institute arrives at the conclusion that the effective relief for German income taxpayers (without taking account of possible lost tax preferences) is greater overall than in the United States, though the tax cuts are less spectacular and the standard of taxation higher.

IFO recommends that still outstanding measures should take heed not only of "fiscal productivity" but also and mainly of such considerations as fiscal justice and tax simplification. IFO notes that such goals and faster implementation could significantly improve the overall effect of the reforms.

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CSO: 36200/259

## SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN LACKS INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT

202 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 3 Jul 87 p 6

[Article by Reinhardt Hassenstein: "Corporations Willing to Relocate Drawn Mostly to the Hamburg 'Fat Belt'"]

[Text] Some 10 weeks before the provincial assembly elections in Schleswig-Holstein on 13 September next, the Land employers' association drew attention to the poor economic development of the region.

Admittedly, association chairman Dr Dietrich Schulz emphasized that his zero growth forecast referred exclusively to commerce. However, with the exception of industries near the consumer stage, the data of other economic sectors do not foreshadow any particularly rosy development this year. Sales expectations for the second half tend to be on the low side; investments are focusing on rationalization, and unemployment is stuck at last year's level. Despite all appeals, Schleswig-Holstein and all the other coastal Laender will not be able to keep pace with economic developments in the south--they are lagging behind.

## Rail Network Not Electrified

The reasons for this development are many, they are generally due to the omissions of earlier years. People in the north, especially in Kiel, tended far too long to cling to ecological concerns, maintaining that the natural beauty of the scenery must not be marred by industrial development.

They were far too late in recognizing that the Land would not in the long run be able to live off the traditional sectors, certainly not off tourism, farming, ship construction and shipping. Still, with the exception of the extremely expensive but fundamentally appropriate major settlement project in the Brunsbuettel industrial area on the lower Elbe, there have as yet not been any really decisive changes.

Even the numerous financial and administrative aid measures adopted by the Land and various municipalities do not suffice to make up the lack of transportation infrastructure, for example. The federal rail network of the Land is still not electrified--being the only such Central European section between Denmark and Italy. Engines must be switched in Hamburg with a

concomitant loss of time, and the trains make the run to Flensburg with diesel engines at the same speed at 15 years ago.

The Land's east-west road network is similarly antiquated. Traffic must painfully negotiate obsolete and hopelessly overburdened federal roads, though here, at least, some relief is promised in the next few years. As far as air traffic is concerned, the Land lacks scheduled connections to an international airport. At the same time the only federal Land located on the coasts of two seas and crossed by the North Baltic Sea Canal, the world's most traveled waterway, does not have a duty free sea port.

No wonder that the Elbe seems an unsurmountable obstacle to corporations willing to invest. And of those who do come anyway, the vast majority settle in a 30 km wide belt north of the Hamburg conurbation. In so doing they help themselves on the one hand to Schleswig-Holstein's resettlement aid (without par in the Federal Republic, especially in the rural districts near the zone borders), and on the other utilize the infrastructure of Hamburg--from traffic connections on land, in the water and in the air to the labor market.

The consequences are obvious. The economic development divides the country into the southern region around Hamburg and along the axis to Luebeck, boasting sound and dynamic growth, and into the regions in the north and along the western coast. The latter are lumbered to an above average extent with problem industries such as construction, ship construction and agriculture.

#### Loss of Industrial Substance

The structural crises of these industries are additionally exacerbating the above mentioned differences in development. In the shipyard cities, in particular, it is almost impossible by the relocation of new and--if possible--innovative enterprises to make up the loss of industrial substance following liquidation or cuts and, therefore, ensure the availability of high quality jobs and purchasing power, infrastructure and the variety of offer. Of course some beginning has been made by some small and very small enterprises. However, though hoped for by politicians and desirable for economic reasons, the relocation of manufacturing plants to Schleswig-Holstein by one or more major Federal German corporations has not so far materialized.

In addition to the inadequacies of the infrastructure in the Land, businessmen inside and outside Schleswig-Holstein on occasion also complain about the policy pursued by the Land government. These complaints refer to the lack of style and the ineptitude shown in dealing with those who are actually needed and ought to be recruited as investors or propagandists for the Land.

#### Considerable Differences Among the Various Industries

While nobody disputes Premier Uwe Barschel's real personal commitment to industrial relocation, businessmen are frequently quite annoyed about the premier's lack of tact in dealing with leading business personalities.

On top of the regional division, economic development also differs with regard to the various sectors of industry. In addition to ship construction and

building construction, all industry (with the exception of the chemical industry) is currently beset by an acute lack of orders, in particular from abroad. That applies not only to the processing sector that, last year, accounted for almost 35 percent of the Land's DM67 million net product. No real growth impulses are expected either from agriculture, the 5 percent share of which in the social product is double that of the average of other federal Laender.

Expectations are greater with regard to the trade, transportation, energy and services sectors (totaling 40 percent), although--similar to other federal Laender--the boom in services arises mainly from former EDP departments of corporations and associations, that have been given their independence. It follows that genuine growth may be expected only from private households and the government.

In addition to many foreign trade contacts (ranging even to the People's Republic of China, courted assiduously by business and the Land government) and to acknowledged financial facilities for potential investments, the northern federal Land can boast a labor force that is well trained and available in sufficient quantities. In conjunction with other initiatives such as (possibly) the establishment of a postgraduate business school in Kiel, the Land in the far north refuses to allow the south to scrape the butter of its bread.

#### Schleswig-Holstein Statistics:

Population: 2.61 million

Industrial worker density (per 1,000 population): 70

Gross domestic product growth--actual percentage: 1984: 3.2; 1985: 0.6;  
1986: 1.9

Unemployment (thousands): 1984: 109.2; 1985: 117.6; 1986: 114.4

Rate of unemployment (percentage): 1984: 10.7; 1985: 11.1; 1986: 10.9.

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## RUHRKOHLE PROFIT SLIDE TO CONTINUE

36200292 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 8 Jul 87 p 12

[Text] The capital resources of Ruhrkohle AG as a percentage of the balance sheet total have been inadequate ever since the corporation was founded 19 years ago. The dramatic worsening of earnings in 1986 caused it to drop to a worrying low--from 9 percent to 6 percent.

Due to calculation procedures in the contractual relations with its most important customers--the steel industry by way of the smelter contract and the electricity supply companies by way of the century contract--the corporation has been buffeted more than any other energy enterprise by the collapse of oil prices and the decline of the dollar. Unless it is able to quickly find out what is going to happen, it will sooner rather than later have to go to the district court. Article 92 of the corporation law provides that notification of loss has to be made whenever more than half the capital stock is lost.

In 1986 and 1987 also, Ruhrkohle AG has been adversely affected by a series of factors:

-- The decline in sales to the steel industry by 17 percent to 22.7 million tons SKE [hard coal units],

-- The severe drop in earnings for gas and coke oven by-products--from DM832 million to DM506 million,

-- The increased stockpiles that cost money,

-- The frequent idle shifts, and

-- In 1986 the so-called retention of DM9 per ton with respect to the coking coal subsidy.

#### Still Liquid as the Result of Withdrawals from the Stockpile

1986 therefore concluded with a loss of DM220 million, compared with a surplus of DM286 million in 1985. Capital resources were stretched even more thinly by this deterioration in earnings.



According to Horn and his fellow board member Jens Jenssen, the corporation is still quite liquid, because the money accruing from withdrawals from the stockpile was profitably invested. However, this joint enterprise of the Ruhr mines--accounting for almost 80 percent of German hard coal production--may well be in difficulties unless the accounting difference with respect to the coking coal subsidy--in other words the difference between the price of imported coal and that of German coal (currently DM150 per ton)--is soon fully settled. As it is, the payments for discount were in fact raised from DM80 to DM100 per ton some time ago.

It is not surprising that Heinz Horn should request the Federal Government to quickly make up its mind about the energy policy to be pursued. Some facts are quite definite: The excess capacity of roughly 6 million tons needs to be reduced as rapidly as possible. In addition the Federal Government is calling for the faster reduction of subsidized supplies to the EEC countries (4 million tons) than originally envisioned, that is from 1991 on.

#### The Century Contract Represents the Basis

Still, the corporation is primarily concerned with the observance of the century contract, in force until 1995, and providing for an annual volume of up to 45 million tons coal for power plants. Ever since, due to the decline in steel output, the steel industry has been consuming less coal, the century contract has increasingly represented the stabilizing element in German hard coal mining. In 1986, too, Ruhrkohle AG's sales here rose once again, by 0.7 million tons to 27.5 million tons. That is half the total sales of Ruhrkohle AG. Even now, at the Ruhrkohle press conference, Horn, a sober and thoughtful man, avoided unduly strong language yet sharply criticized some opinions on exports--present also in the Federal Ministry for Economics--according to which the promised volume might be called in question by limiting the calculation of the electricity pfennig. He firmly believes that a word once given must be kept.

#### Quick Political Decision Needed

The forthcoming coal round, set to assemble in early fall (according to Horn quite late in the day), needs to settle the matter. While not wishing to dramatize the situation, he is well aware that the workers are in turmoil. Protest actions against suspected closures tend to occur more frequently.. Works Director Fritz Ziegler points out that, from 1968/1969--the year it was founded--Ruhrkohle AG has reduced its coal pits by 31 to 19, closed 20 coking plants and abolished 75,000 jobs. This happened "without social friction." No such battles as were fought in England some time ago were experienced on the Ruhr. Even so, the Ruhrkohle board admits, the social acceptance of closures has been dearly bought.

In answer to the question whether Ruhrkohle AG still had some undisclosed reserves Horn said that this was definitely the case with respect to the equity portfolio, but that, on the other hand, there were also some "undisclosed hazards." The Ruhrkohle board would not even consider selling its investments such as the 18 percent holding in Ruhrgas AG, the more than 70 percent holding in Steag or the investment in Ruetgers. Horn cites as the

reason for that refusal the fact that these investments are of an integrating nature: Coking gas production, electricity production and coking by-product sales. Moreover, in view of the amounts of the subsidy in question (more than DM3 billion coking coal subsidy in 1987), the sale of investments would help only in the short run. After all, in 1986 Ruhrkohle investments yielded revenues of about DM120 (100) million.

Looking at the acute concerns of Ruhrkohle AG we tend to forget that it operates quite successfully in some fields, for example in commerce (in part in conjunction with Krupp), and also in the search for new spheres of operation, such as waste disposal, where abandoned coal mines may be put to use.

#### Ruhrkohle Corporation

Million DM	1985	1987
Turnover	22,515	20,923
Percentage Change	0.4	- 7.0
including:		
Hard coal including briquettes	10,235	10,341
Coke	4,386	3,510
Gas/coke oven by-products	821	506
Electricity/Long Distance Heat	1,739	1,809
Carbon Chemical Sector	1,900	1,644
Trade/Services and Miscellaneous Related Sectors	3,434	3,113
Hard Coal Production (million tons)	58.7	57.7
Coke Production (million tons)	11.7	12.2
Electricity production (billion kilowatt hours)	16.4	17.1
Coal sales (million tons)	60.6	55.0
Personnel	133,153	132,570
Employment Costs	8,126	8,313
Total Investments	1,191	1,248
Capital Expenditure	643	576
Write-offs as a Percentage of Total Investments	70	73
Gross Cash Flow *)	1,300	800
Capital Reserves	1,977	1,873
of which Share Capital	535	535
Balance Sheet Total	17,008	17,923
Capital Reserve Ratio (percent)	9	6

Explanations: \*) According to information provided by the corporation

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## BRIEFS

RUHRKOHLE PROSPECTS FOR 1987--Following board chairman Heinz Horn's report of the radically worse situation at Ruhrkohle AG, Essen, the largest German hard coal mining company by far, it will be necessary to institute another two idle shifts. Already 19 idle shifts have been planned for 1987, but despite them the corporation's stockpiles will most probably rise from 9.8 million tons to 11.7 million tons this year. Horn appealed to the politicians to guarantee the validity of existing contracts and at last come to a clear decision on the adjustment measures deemed crucial. In 1986, the last financial year, Ruhrkohle AG recorded a loss of DM220 million. Capital reserves shrank to 6 percent of the balance sheet total. Sales will decline in 1987 also. [Text] [36200292 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 8 Jul 87 p 1] 11698

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## CENTRAL BANK LOSING HALF MILLION DAILY SUPPORTING USSR DEBT

## Clearing Account Interest

36170134b Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Aug 87 p 3

[Text] The Bank of Finland subsidizes Finnish exporters to the extent of about 500,000 markkas a day, or about 200 million markkas a year. This estimate will be valid as long as the Soviet Union has an interest-free debt to Finland of about 400 million rubles, or 2.8 billion markkas, in the clearing account.

The estimate is based on the assumption that the Bank of Finland is itself paying interest at the rate of about 7.5 percent for the financing of the debt. These expenditures are passed on to the entire national economy through the Bank of Finland's monetary policy.

The basic principle of trade between Finland and the Soviet Union is a clearcut one: Imports are paid for with exports. However, the central bank always pays the bills of exporters to the Soviet Union, even though there are not enough imports to cover them.

The two countries agreed on a credit limit so that import volume need not constantly be as high as export volume. It would in practice be impossible to keep trade constantly in balance. Originally, however, the idea was for both countries to incur debts equally and in turn--not for one country to be indebted for a long period of time.

About 300 million rubles of the debt incurred by the Soviet Union in 1986 has been transferred to an interest-bearing special account. The partners are keeping the rate of interest secret. The outstanding debt in the special account is protected against the risk of a [fluctuating] ruble exchange rate by tying it to a reserve composed of several foreign currencies.

If, in the estimation of the experts, the reserve is in keeping with the Soviet State Bank's foreign currency reserve, the dollar accounts for 42 percent of it, the Deutsche mark 19, the Swiss and French francs as well as the pound 10 and the yen 9 percent of it.

## USSR Exports Unchanged

36170134b Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Aug 87 p 26

[Article by Kustaa Hulkko: "Kalevi Sorsa: 'Soviet Exports at About Last Year's Level'"]

[Text] Moscow--Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat) predicts that Finland's exports to the Soviet Union will remain "at about last year's level."

"This means that the threatening outlook of last fall is disappearing," Sorsa said on Wednesday. He was alluding to former Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen's (Center Party) prediction that the Soviet trade would plummet this year along with the price of oil.

The meeting of the chairmen of the Finnish-Soviet Economic Commission ended in Moscow on Wednesday when Soviet chairman Vladimir Kamentsev also joined the assembly. The negotiations lasted 3 days. They were conducted in the Soviet cities of Tbilisi and Moscow.

The other ministerial participants in the meeting were commission vice chairmen Trade and Industry Minister Ilkka Suominen and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Vsevolod Vorontsov.

According to Sorsa, Finnish and Soviet views are in agreement that exports will increase even beyond the present figures before this fall is out because of the rise in the price of oil. He did not announce exact figures.

"We do not, however, hope that people will rush to the door of the License Bureau," the foreign minister said on Wednesday evening. In Finland it is the function of the License Bureau to control exports to the Soviet Union. Export permits for shipments must be obtained from the bureau, which has been given the job of keeping exports and imports tightly in balance this year.

Sorsa said that he believed that the 4.5-million-ton reexport oil quota agreed on by Finland would be filled in 1987. Finland has notified the Soviet Union that it is prepared to reexport even more oil to third countries. Both countries feel that oil for reexport will play an important role in balancing trade in 1988 too.

Sorsa said that imports have otherwise increased beyond the quota minimums set in the trade agreement.

Insofar as is known, the quota minimums for Ladas and natural gas, among others, have been exceeded.

Sorsa said that he felt that bilateral trade is still the mainstay of trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. Finland is also making an effort to increase trade conducted with foreign exchange to the extent the reform of the Soviet economy and Soviet foreign trade permits. "Nor do I feel that this would be impossible," Sorsa said.

Finland and the Soviet Union decided to appoint a payment and financing committee to find solutions to problems particularly associated with joint venture and compensation trade finance problems.



Ilkka Suominen said that taxation is also one of the tasks assigned to the committee. Finland's current tax agreement with the Soviet Union is more inconvenient from the standpoint of our firms than is the case with some other Western countries. Reform of the system is now being worked on. In the meantime we are trying to obtain arrangements that would guarantee Finland the same advantages its competitors have.

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## SORSA COMMENTS ON MEASURES TO CUT SOVIETS' TRADE DEBT

36170134a Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Aug 87 p 26

[Article by Kustaa Hulkko: "They Have New Measures in View in Tbilisi: Soviet Trade Debt to Be Reduced as Early as This Year"]

[Text] Tbilisi--Finland is aiming at increasing this year's trade with the Soviets to a volume even higher than the figures recorded in early August, about 1.8 billion rubles, or about 12.6 billion markkas.

We have also set ourselves the objective of reducing the Soviet trade debt passed on from last year if the way the Soviet trade develops during the second half of the year at all permits.

The Finnish chairman of the Economic Commission, Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa, considers the outlook for the Soviet trade for this year to be very reasonable.

"The situation does not appear to be on any account hopeless," Sorsa told HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Tbilisi on Tuesday.

In Sorsa's opinion, current estimates are clearly brighter than earlier ones.

The meeting of the Economic Commission chairmen continued on Tuesday in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. So far only trade prospects for this year and next year have been discussed. Other issues, like joint ventures, have not yet been discussed.

## Finland Has Dual Objective

Finland has now adopted a dual strategy: On the one hand, we want to break up part of the log jam of export licenses and, on the other, we also want to reduce the Soviet debt that accumulated last year.

In practice carrying out the objective would mean that a large number of applications for construction and other export permits that have been piling up in the License Bureau, which oversees Soviet exports, will not be approved this year.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union would pay part of its approximately 400-million-ruble debt, which is in a Bank of Finland clearing account. A

condition for the implementation of this approach is that the Soviet Union in turn achieve an export surplus in the trade between the two countries this year. It is not yet certain that a surplus will be effected; that will depend on realization of the agreed-on oil sales and the scheduling of their payments, among other things.

Finland has about 700 million rubles, or just under 5 billion markkas, coming from the Soviet Union. Of that amount, 300 million rubles have been transferred to a special account, the payment schedule for which has also been agreed on.

So far they have not decided what is to be done with the debt in the clearing account. In principle the credit limit for the account is only 300 million rubles.

#### Vorontsov Emphasizes Role of Additional Imports

Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Vsevolod Vorontsov expressed his opinion to HELSINGIN SANOMAT that trade in 1987 appears to be developing very satisfactorily. Vorontsov felt that there were no visible signs of the predicted major reductions.

The Soviet Union is aiming at keeping trade volume at least at last year's level next year as well and then we would not need to substantially reduce Finnish exports.

"This is why we need special measures for next year to increase Finland's imports from the Soviet Union," Vorontsov said.

"Finland's import volume ought to be greater than its exports since Finland's accounts receivable must be reduced," he said.

Sorsa said that Finland's partner plans to bring up the problems involved in imposing an order of importance for construction projects. The commission's committees have been given this job of so-called prioritization before.

Sorsa indicated that there are projects that generate needless planning expenditures and that the Rakvere project was one of these. He said that the buyer's right to choose a seller, of course, otherwise prevails in trade matters.

The Rakvere project is the meat-processing complex to be built in Estonia and which several Finnish construction companies offered to build for the Soviet Union for many years.

In the end not a single one of them got to enjoy the fruits of their planning efforts. To everyone's surprise, Finnish Construction Exports, founded by Ilpo Kakkila, won the contract. Kakkila is the former head of Basic Combine's Soviet trade department. Basic Combine was also one of the possible contractors for the Rakvere project.

### Border Crossing Points Discussed

Foreign Minister Sorsa intends to find out at the meeting how the Soviet Union feels about possible new border crossing points between the two countries. The purpose of this would be to create new routes and resorts for tourism.

One border crossing point could be Vartius, through which a route to Murmansk would run. The governor of the Murmansk area has discussed the matter with Finnish officials.

The leaders of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Karelia have spoken with Pohjois-Karjala officials about opening a border crossing point at Niirala. Goods traffic is already moving to the Soviet Union via Niirala.

A route skirting Ladoga, which would possibly also make a detour to old Valamo, would originate in Niirala.

The third point might be at Imatra. There the inhabitants of Imatra have proposed an initiative for trips to Svetogorsk of less than 24 hours duration that could be made without visas.

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## SOVIET OFFICIAL URGES JOINT PROJECTS IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS

36170134c Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Aug 87 p 26

[Text] Finnish business firms should develop cooperation with the Soviet Union aimed at the Third World countries. Soviet Embassy counselor V.E. Ivachov was of this opinion in a speech he made at a seminar in Oulu on Thursday dealing with economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Northern Finland.

The Soviet discussants at the seminar also hoped that small businesses would make a bolder effort to gain Soviet markets. Furthermore, in his opinion, Finland ought to try to enlarge the selection of goods it imports from the Soviet Union.

At the present time the main form of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Finland is that Finnish firms serve as Soviet subcontractors. According to Ivachov, this cooperation could in future be developed in a significant way.

In Ivachov's opinion, the two countries should establish joint engineering and marketing ventures which would help them in discovering possible projects and technologies. In this way they could obtain competitive packages that would best suit both the customer and the manufacturer or provider of services.

According to Ivachov, the Soviets have no experience with the creation of such ventures or with the practical aspects involved. This is why it would be profitable for Finnish firms to launch initiatives in this field.

The embassy counselor hoped that scientific-technological and commercial-economic cooperation between our two countries would also be combined. According to him, in this we could find the way to the development and production of equipment based on the latest scientific and technological advances.

"In this way technical potential, investments and the ability to produce equipment quickly for either local or Third World markets would be combined," Ivachov asserted. Finnish and Soviet organizations are at present cooperating on 16 projects in 11 countries.

According to B.V. Sergeyev, a deputy trade representative of the Soviet trade delegation who spoke at the seminar, Finland should make an effort to import products other than raw materials from the Soviet Union in order to develop our



trade. In his opinion, the kinds of imports should be changed in the direction of machine industry and more highly processed products.

Sergeyev felt that it is regrettable that the supplying of machines and equipment is still a one-way affair. Finland does indeed buy equipment from the Soviet Union, but it returns to the country as part of some larger piece of equipment.

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RAUTARUUKKI TO DELIVER 1,900 RAILCARS TO USSR IN 1988

36170134d Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Aug 87 p 27

[Article: First paragraph is HELSINGIN SANOMAT introduction]

[Text] Without more orders production capacity will again fall short.

Rautaruukki has signed contracts with the Soviet Union to deliver special cars worth a total of nearly 700 million markkas for next year.

It has also contracted to import Soviet parts to be used on the cars. The value of the imports will come to over 200 million markkas.

According to the contract, the Rautaruukki special car unit will deliver 1,900 rail cars to the Soviet Union in the course of next year. The production program includes four types of cars.

Rautaruukki is continuing negotiations for more shipments. The company would be capable of producing 3,000 rail cars a year.

"The volume of cars in the contract just signed is at the same level as our production volume for this year. Further negotiations will be entered into, but they will essentially depend on how Finnish-Soviet trade in general develops and on how the trade negotiations for next year go," Seppo Sahlman, the manager of the Rautaruukki special car unit, said.

#### New Types of Cars Too

The production of cars to haul liquid sulphur will begin this fall at the Taivalkoski plant. This type of car is a new one and the most demanding type of car so far for Rautaruukki. A total of over 300 of these cars will be delivered this and next year.

Next year Rautaruukki will deliver 400 mineral fertilizer cars of a new type which it has developed itself to Soviet customers.

The other types of cars contracted for delivery next year are extensions of the timber and passenger-car transport car series currently in production.

The rollers, automatic clutches, chief brake equipment components and hot-rolled steel beams, from which the frameworks for the cars to be made by Rautaruukki, will be shipped from the Soviet Union. Soviet shipments will account for about a third of the value of the cars.

Rautaruukki's car production will provide jobs for 950 workers. Seppo Sahlman did not want to speculate as to how many workers would be employed by the Otankmaki and Taivalkoski plants if they were to operate at full capacity. According to Sahlman, the number of workers will depend on how technically exacting the production of the cars is.

The Rautaruuki car plants were built in Taivalkoski and Otankmaki, which belongs to the parish of Vuolijoki, because the aim was to provide employment for the miners left without work when the mines at Otankmaki and Mustavaara were exhausted. An annual production of as many as 6,000 rail cars was promised for the plants. Finland and the Soviet Union did not, however, reach agreement on the price level for all the rail cars and the number of cars that have been produced is less than what was originally promised.

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